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Executive summary 
 
 
The UK stands apart from other G7 countries, and indeed the rest of Europe, with its low 
levels of productivity. The current Conservative Government have attempted to address 
these concerns through the introduction of a “strong” industrial policy. Despite such an 
attempt to strengthen the UK’s productivity, this policy has been met with criticism. 
Trade unions and professional bodies alike have criticised the policy for lacking 
infrastructure and investment to translate the policy into improved productivity outcomes. 
In this context, this project investigates productivity bargaining in the UK in four sectors, 
manufacturing (automotive), retail, hospitality and healthcare. In each of these four 
sectors, four areas were investigated, pay and reward, voice and participation, skills and 
work organisation and inclusion and diversity. Drawing on results from qualitative 
interviews with social partners in each sector the results show little attention paid to 
productivity in the UK. 
The main finding of this national report is an employer preoccupation with lowering unit 
cost and the dominance of the financialisation agenda. Across the sectors, pay and reward 
practices mainly revolve around either performance based pay or seniority pay. We found 
little evidence of voice and participation, as there are low levels of trade union 
membership with the exception of healthcare, and a narrow scope with non-union 
employee participation. Working conditions are generally not covered by collective 
bargaining, with the exception of healthcare and the automotive sector. In the automotive 
company where we undertook the research, there was a high level of involvement and 
commitment, particularly from core workers, but this mainly focused on quality 
enhancement and incremental innovation. This is a Japanese inspired type of management 
which is more common for the sector and has also its impact on other sectors. 
Social partners in each sector reported a lack of investment in skills. Although a lack of 
skills and skilling initiatives have been reported widely, employers seem to be more 
concerned to deploy a short-term strategy and rather attract employees with bonuses if 
needed rather than develop and implement long-term investment. 
Inclusion and diversity initiatives mainly focused on gender related issues, but were 
usually reactive rather than proactive. In general, such strategies were not core to the 
business and their impact was limited, in most cases. Inclusion and diversity actions were 
mostly driven by the business agenda rather than social justice rationale. In particular, 
organisational change for the long term was rare.  
The report concludes, therefore, that productivity does not play an important role in the 
UK. Productivity, however, is very relevant for the UK and has potential to lead to change 
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in the workplace, but the nature and impact of productivity is often contested at this level. 
Decentralised collective bargaining within this liberal market economy has led to 
workplaces with weak unions and a management preoccupation with lowering unit costs. 
Healthcare stands apart in this respect with its multi-union, nationally determined terms 
and conditions. Yet despite this more European model of collective bargaining, the sector 
still experiences a lack of investment in skills, a preoccupation with unit cost and limited 
attention to inclusion and diversity. 
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Section 1. 
Productivity and the agenda of industrial relations 
 
 
In June 2016 a referendum was held, which is now known as the Brexit-referendum. As 
a consequence the Prime Minister, Theresa May, called a General Election on 8th June 
2017, to possibly have a broader support for the negotiations with the EU in the future. 
In the perspective of a post-Brexit economy, inflation levels went up to 2.3%, mainly 
caused by the low level of the Pound Sterling. A concern is the persistently low 
productivity of the UK’s workforce in comparison to equivalent European and North 
American economies. This relatively low productivity is, despite rapidly falling 
unemployment, down from its post-crisis peak of 2.66 million. A more nuanced analysis 
of the UK’s apparent recovery suggests that the figures mask the following tendencies:  
 
• wage suppression;  
• employment growth in low wage, low skill, low value-added sectors, often with 
precarious conditions of work; 
• economic growth that can be attributed more to rising property prices and 
consumer spending rather than more productive workplaces. 
 
In terms of seeking to leverage productivity through collective industrial relations, the 
UK has not had de facto co-ordinated productivity bargaining since the economic and 
industrial crises of the 1970s. This can be seen as evidence of the emergence of the UK 
in the light of the neoliberal turn as a liberal market economy (LME) (see the essays 
collected in Hall & Soskice 2001). LMEs are counterpoised with the coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) of Northern Europe (e.g. Germany), and more ambiguously with 
France and Italy. 
The collapse of UK productivity bargaining from the 1970s onwards can be attributed 
inter alia to the following principal tendencies: 
• the historically laissez faire and voluntarist code of UK collective bargaining and 
industrial relations more generally; 
• profound shifts in the nature of UK industrial and economic policies from 1979 
associated with Thatcherite neoliberalism and associated rapid 
deindustrialisation; 
• the marginalisation and decline of the trade union movement both in terms of 
membership and influence in line with both broad global trends and in the face of 
a hostile government; 
• the decentralisation and localisation of collective bargaining. 
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In terms of the state’s role in supporting workplace performance, a post-1979 ideological 
aversion by both Conservative and Labour administrations – in rhetorical terms at least – 
to prescription and direct intervention in industrial relations means that the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) has only adopted an advisory and signposting 
stance when encouraging productivity enhancement. The Ministry mainly focuses on 
implementing policy seeking to increase labour flexibility, like through zero-hour 
contracts, under the assumption being that a precarious workforce is a productive one. 
The improvement of skills is mainly left to the employers who may invest in key sectors 
and leave others untouched. 
With regard to unions, in the 1980s the Conservative Thatcher administration 
ambivalently enacted legislative measures to curtail trade union activity, particularly 
militancy. This statement is not to say that union presence in workplaces was destroyed, 
but bargaining coverage has also contracted, as has the scope of the agenda, due in part 
to concession bargaining strategies by unions in certain sectors. Both Conservative and 
Labour governments have provided grants for trade union modernisation and to support 
the union lifelong learning agenda whereby unions can facilitate and bargain for 
vocational training. Otherwise, the union movement – and by implication collective 
bargaining – are afforded no formal role in strategies for productivity improvement at the 
national or sectoral levels. 
However, the endurance of collective bargaining in certain sectors means that at a lower 
level, company or plant level, productivity and performance imperatives are on the 
bargaining agenda or play a role in day-to-day politics at the shop floor. Also other aspects 
of the work organisation, impacted by and directed towards the enhancement of 
productivity, play a role. It is our suggestion at this stage that these productivity 
imperatives will be manifest in outcomes that tend to be viewed through a HRM lens. 
Four salient dimensions of workforce management activity that are considered to have a 
central impact on performance. 
1. Employee reward: pay and conditions, and how management and unions can 
negotiate pay (or otherwise) outcomes as a means of encouraging performance  
2. Participation and involvement: frameworks and patterns of worker involvement 
in workplace decision making, at various levels of the firm, to produce 
performance outcomes. This might range from information and consultation to 
more direct forms of participation in terms of finance and voice. 
3. Skills and work organisation: particularly in the age of the so-called knowledge 
economy, how managers and unions negotiate enhanced skills and capacity 
through work systems. 
4. Inclusion and diversity: optimising labour market utilisation through including 
hitherto marginalised and under-utilised groups such as women, particular ethnic 
groups, disabled people and older workers. 
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As hinted at earlier, these dimensions have a different emphasis in the UK than on the 
continent. Before elaborating on this, we will explain in more detail the changes that have 
taken place where productivity has been moved from the agenda at national level and 
became more relevant, although implicitly, at the agenda of shop floor politics. 
11 
 
 
 
Section 2. 
The political economy of productivity in the UK: 
the after war period 
 
 
For over three decades the UK has presented something of an enigma to economists with 
persistently low levels of productivity seemingly coexisting with phases of relatively 
healthy economic growth. Like in other European countries the economy went through a 
period of relative stable development with multi-employers agreements led by the 
overarching aim to create a steady growth and full employment. Differently from many 
continental countries, however, this policy objective was meant to be achieved within the 
voluntary system of employment relations with a lower degree of government 
intervention. The implication for the power relations between social partners is an 
enhanced bargaining power of employees and trade unions (Kelly 2013). At the same 
time, employers of especially big companies were content to have a low level of legal 
regulation and deal with trade unions in case of conflict resolution even if this would 
mean unions would have extensive rights. Negotiations of collective bargaining were, 
like in many other countries across Europe, aiming at common objectives of full 
employment and keeping low inflation levels. This system of late Fordism, where 
production was regulated by the conditions of mass production and strongly integrated 
collective relationships was pursued during the thirty years of high growth of the 
economy (‘les trente glorieuses’). A major element of such a Fordist system of 
coordinated, multi-employer collective bargaining is ‘joint consultation’ as the support 
from both sides of the employment relationship would be the basis to achieve macro-level 
objectives – even if the state would stay out of the voluntarist employee relationships 
(Clegg, Chester 1953; Hall, Purcell 2012). Nevertheless, Marsh (1992) believed that the 
1960s and 1970s could be looked upon as a period with a strong political role for trade 
unions and involvement with government policy (as mentioned in Salamon 2003, 179). 
The role of multi-employer collective bargaining declined, however, steadily during the 
after-war period. While 60% of private sector employees were covered by multi-
employer agreements, this decreased to 35% by 1970 and dropped further to only 10% in 
1990, which implied even the disappearance of a basis for a two-tier agreement (Brown 
et al., 1995). In the breaking up of multi-employer agreements, the withdrawal of larger 
organisations played a major role. The background of this decentralisation has been 
primarily the strategy of management to meet the demands in the global market with the 
introduction of increased levels of flexibility (Salamon 2003a, 356).  
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Productivity levels were low compared with competitors like the USA and the major 
economies across Europe and many commentators linked the low levels of productivity 
growth to the system of employment relations, which led to the large-scale negotiated 
reforms of collective bargaining between 1968 and the late 1970s. The failure of such 
attempts and the strong resistance of trade unions, who were still powerful, led the way 
to the intervention by the government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Kelly 
2013, 171). 
 
 
1. Decentralisation of collective bargaining 
 
At the end of the 1960s problems with productivity were increasingly more 
conceptualised as a problem with employment relations, which therefore needed reform 
(Waddington 2016). The Donovan Commission was established as a committee of experts 
to research the roots of the malaise, which would be behind the image of the UK being 
‘the sick man of Europe’. The report published in 1968 identified the system of two-tier 
collective bargaining in most private industries. The formalised system of industry-level 
agreements provided the minimum level of pay for organisation-level bargaining where 
unions were strong and employers were willing to pay more in case of labour market 
conditions that were favourable for employees. Then, what was labelled ‘wage drift’, 
resulted from bargaining on top of and above the rate set at the national level was 
perceived as a major factor leading to high inflation levels, the control of which was 
actually a core macro policy objective (Salamon 2003a, 355). The Donovan report did, 
however, not put the blame – at least not exclusively – on trade unions and the way they 
would promote under-employment by applying rules of demarcation and protective 
measures to protect employees in certain jobs. In the analysis, senior management were 
held responsible for neglecting industrial relations issues and allowing foremen and 
supervisors to enter into covert and cosy deals with shop floor representatives (Nolan, 
O’Donnell 1995, 408).  
The recommendation of the Donovan Commission report was a continuation of the 
voluntary system with some adjustment. It concluded that there was a tension between 
the formalised system of collective bargaining at the sectoral level and the more informal 
system of bargaining at the plant level of a company. The ‘custom and practice’ at the 
workplace with management and shops stewards having a relative degree of autonomy 
could not easily be replaced by a more centralised system which would meet resistance 
from both trade unions and employers. Adapting policies at the sectoral level to the plant 
level would not be an option as informal rights were a strong element of the decentralised 
system of employment relations in the UK (Donovan Report 1968). The report 
recommended rather to integrate shop stewards in the collective bargaining system and 
formalise procedures in order to promote more comprehensive factory agreements, which 
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meant, de facto, a formalisation of informal customs at decentral level (Nolan, O’Donnell 
1995, 408). 
As an offspring from the Donovan report a permanent Commission of Industrial Relations 
was established, which helped to formalise negotiation and disputes procedures, to 
formalise the role of shop stewards, rationalise pay systems and introduce new 
arrangements for discipline and dismissals. These proposals changed part of the scenery 
of industrial relations, with the attempt to join the European Economic Community. At 
the time trade unions became also more cautious about ‘free collective bargaining’. 
Another factor was the increasing activity of a growing number of multinationals making 
a comparison with overseas practices of industrial relations more common (Hyman 1995, 
47). 
From the period of the end of the 1960s it became clear that a strong coordination was 
not and, maybe, could not be achieved. A policy of ‘planned growth of incomes’ – led by 
the wish to keep inflation low, having a low public expenditure and high performance – 
was also from the side of Labour looked upon as being tolerable rather than being 
supported (Hyman 1995, 42-43). The preoccupation with productivity, hinted at above, 
and the lack of competitiveness as the main issue for macro policies, was, however, 
projected by British industry itself first of all as caused by industrial relations 
arrangements. The main themes addressed in this context were the high level of strikes, 
the strong trade union power and restrictive practices with hiring and employing 
employees. 
Hyman (1995) points to the logic that low paid workers would try to increase their 
earnings through overtime – a rather common practice in manufacturing, which was 
behind a high level of labour costs. Also a high degree of job control could be beneficial 
to earn a higher wage through piecework bargaining (pp. 45-46). 
Nolan and Walsh (1995, 69-70) show how the UK became a low labour cost economy 
with low wages and low productivity when compared with the US and other European 
countries. This clearly shows how causes and strategies are intertwined at various levels 
of analysis: the macro-level, company-level, plant-level and that of the individual 
employee. 
 
 
2. Collective bargaining and productivity: the Fawley case and beyond 
 
The relationship between collective bargaining, the influence and power of trade unions 
and productivity has never been a straightforward, clear-cut causal relationship and will 
therefore always be contested. Pencavel (1977), for example, considered the growth of 
unionism in the coal industry as contributing to the decline of output as ‘a totally 
unionized coal field produces some 22 percent less output than a completely ununionized 
coal field’ (p. 145). This view has increasingly become more the dominant one underlying 
Thatcherism in the 1980s and thereafter the Blair period of government. For some, the 
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lack of involvement and a weak trade union movement could be looked upon as leading 
to disinvestment, or postponement in research and development, and a road to low-skilled 
labour with low wages. To point at the restrictive role of trade unions with regard to job 
demarcations and the disruptive practices with high strike frequencies is therefore at the 
least biased, if not misleading. Some argue, therefore, that the low-cost economy led, in 
the 1960s and 1970s, to a disinvestment in human capital and training (Nolan, Walsh 
1995, 80). In effect, research in the car industry shows that the low levels of pay in the 
industry made it less attractive for manufacturers to invest in capital intensive methods 
(Nolan, O’Donnell 1995, 411). In fact the low cost of labour was a barrier to the 
disappearance of inefficient firms. Although this does not exclude a possible effect from 
industrial relations on performance it shows again the need to look at the demand side of 
the labour market. This is also a strong argument for an analysis of the current situation 
of the economy where there may be the need for a stronger wage-led economy with more 
incentives to industry for innovation and wage growth and, particularly, more equality 
between various jobs and job-levels (see Kleinknecht 2015). 
In this context the ‘Fawley case’ of the Esso Fawley refinery stands out with its objective 
to increase productivity levels. As the first productivity agreement, laid down in what was 
called the ‘Blue Book’, it was an historic productivity agreement. It implied the 
introduction of changes in pay systems and work arrangements. In 1962 subsequent 
agreements followed this route to productivity enhancement (McKersie, Hunter 1973, 7). 
The measures meant a package deal, where a strong link was made between working 
methods and changes in pay and working conditions. This was not a one way management 
intervention in order to further optimise and rationalise production methods, but the 
outcome of a long term oriented process of collective bargaining of which the agreement 
was the formal confirmation. 
In line with the changes taking place in industrial relations the agreements were 
negotiated at plant-level; different from the industry-wide agreements that were more 
common until then (ibid.). The way the agreement worked resembled a partnership 
agreement as it was guided by common objectives of management and trade unions where 
pay became closely linked to productivity (-increase).  
The outcomes of the agreements were interpreted by McKersie and Hunter (1973) 
primarily as perceived in terms of employment relations, the equality of treatment, 
protection of earning and also as a vehicle of employee participation. This could support 
the introduction of new technology and the move away from the craft system that was 
more dominant than in other industrialised economies. In many studies on productivity 
levels a lack of technology is mentioned as a factor that hinders productivity. At the time 
the strength of trade unions in the decentralised system of industrial relations delayed the 
adoption and diffusion of new technology. 
Ahlstrand (1990) carried out a later study on the Fawley case fifteen years after Flanders 
(1964). He sheds a different light on the changes that took place with the productivity 
agreement. Participation was, in his view, limited to restrictive autonomy for workers, 
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which was not meaningful and effective participation. More importantly, the objectives 
of higher productivity were not evidenced. Rather it became clear that productivity 
bargaining had established itself as a fixture of the Fawley management culture. As is 
often the case with a specific organisation’s culture there were employees acting as 
storytellers when they referred back to the Blue Book. Beside this question of actual 
impact of the agreement on productivity levels, there is a clear motivation behind this and 
other productivity agreements at the time. The Esso experiment addressed explicitly an 
industrial relations problem that was more general and symptomatic for the British 
industry, low productivity levels and enduring high levels of overtime work combined 
with low wages. The content of the Blue Book focused first of all on what was called the 
productivity package – to create more flexibility in the workplace and to change overtime 
and ‘unproductive hours,’ the consolidation of pay rates to a limited number of shift 
grades – and the systematic attack on overtime to a very limited percentage of the formal 
working hours. The company offered, in return, large increases of pay as much as up to 
forty percent. Working hours went down to forty hours a week and the company 
guaranteed no redundancies as this was crucial to guarantee job security and, hence, to 
create a level of support and build up some trust with employees (McKersie, Hunter 1973, 
37-8). 
The outcome of the agreement is overall seen as positive, although there was some 
resistance from shop stewards. Trade unions could point to the increase of pay levels and 
the shortening of working hours, while management could decrease some slack in the 
work organisation increasing flexibility and decreasing the rigidities of job demarcations 
that were most common. Ahlstrand questions the last point stating that, in the case that 
management was convinced about the effectiveness of the programme: why then was the 
agreement followed up with further agreements? In line with the argument of Fox (1974) 
it could be argued that the bureaucratisation that went with the implementation with the 
first and later agreement was a sign of lack of trust among the management (Ahlstrand 
1990, 87-8).  
In the 1960s there was an increasing number of productivity-type agreements, as 
mentioned by McKersie and Hunter (1973), implemented in different sectors like 
manufacturing, utilities and communication, with the highest numbers in the chemical 
industry (p. 45). With the new Labour Government that came into power towards the end 
of the 1960s a new wave of agreements came in as part of the income policy that the 
Government adopted to control prices and incomes in order to combat high inflation 
during that period. The productivity agreements were meant to determine wage increases 
by improvements of productivity and demanding essentially more adaptability from the 
employees (ibid.: 57). The analysis on data on the second wave of productivity 
agreements shows a stronger emphasis on the quantity of work and working methods, 
hence the rationalisation objective of productivity agreements and the increasing control 
of the management by introducing job evaluation schemes etc. (ibid.: 75-7). The same 
authors point to the key role of bargaining structures that are more decentralised. 
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Productivity agreements could only work when they refer to the plant-level where the 
main problems of productivity levels were identified. In some cases, like the printing 
industry, it was, however, not only about the hierarchical level of bargaining, but also 
about horizontal forces. In the printing sector the implementation of the productivity 
agreement led to an overall increase of unit labour costs of 2 percent (ibid.: 260-3).  
In the 1980s there was a next phase of productivity agreements at the Fawley plant. In 
1981 management came with an extensive and persuasive communication stating the 
plant badly needed organisational change, preventing the diversion of funds and projects 
to other refineries that would be more efficient across Europe. The overarching aim was 
more outspoken here on manning levels, the increase of flexibility, for example taking 
more duties on with regard to maintenance, and, at the same time, a shortening of the 
training period (Ahlstrand 1990, 149-50). It should be no surprise that the implementation 
of this productivity agreement, as it was not so much the outcome of a productivity ‘social 
partnership’, would meet more resistance. After some delay and renegotiations with the 
union TGWU there was a downsizing of the employment, but other aspects, like the 
flexibility aimed for, were not rewarded by the union. Ahlstrand (1990) concludes that 
the productivity bargaining, even taking the objectives formulated in the agreements, was 
not very successful or, as a front line supervisor put it “I can’t really identify a single 
positive effect of any of the productivity deals. If I was forced to think about one, I’d say 
they gave me formal approval to do some things I was already doing in the yard anyway” 
(ibid., 159). 
Although the agenda on industrial relations and productivity became less prominent, the 
problem of labour productivity did not disappear. On the contrary, it is fair to state that 
productivity in the UK is in crisis. 
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Section 3. 
Overview on labour productivity developments 
 
 
UK productivity is 19% points lower than the other G71 countries (Harari 2017). 
Historically, UK productivity increased approximately 2% each year, however, since the 
recession growth has stalled (Harari 2017). Such a stagnation is unheard of in the post 
war period (Elliot 2015), and poor productivity has blighted the UK for decades (Sisson 
2014). 
In the 10 years prior to the 2008/9 recession UK productivity (calculated as gross value 
added (real terms) divided by total number of hours worked in the economy) was growing 
at around 2% per year (Harari 2017). The recession saw a sharp decrease in productivity 
where output fell faster than hours worked (Harari 2017). 
The graph below shows whole economy productivity from 1971. 
 
Figure 1: Whole economy productivity 
 
 
 
Source: ONS 2017 
 
What is overt from this graph is the relatively flat level of productivity since the recession, 
which is in contrast to the relative growth in previous decades (Harari 2017). These 
changes are demonstrated in the graph below: 
 
                                                
1 United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 2: Productivity growth annual % change 
 
 
 
Source: Harari 2017, 6 
 
Figure (3) shows fluctations in the output of labour per hour worked, with a sharp decline 
during the financial crisis and a considerable improvement of labour productivity only 
since around 2016: 
 
Figure 3: Output per hour worked 
 
 
 
Source: Harari, 2017, 7 
 
Before the recession the manufacturing and service sectors saw productivity rises every 
year from 1997 and over the period since then average levels have fluctuated but have 
not changed structurely (Harari 2017). After the recession, productivity in the 
manufacturing sector has seen stronger growth than the service sector (Harari 2017), see 
figure 3 above. 
Although there are various complicating factors of measuring labour productivity, 
particularly when attempts are made to isolate it from the impact of technology and 
strategic factors, in the following a comparison will be made of productivity figures for 
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the sectors examined in this project. Productivity has been calculated as GVA/thousand 
hours worked. The data has then been placed at a base year of 1995. 
 
Figure 4: Productivity per thousand hours worked 
 
 
 
Source: WERU on OECD 
 
Figure 4 clearly shows that all sectors dipped in the recession with the automotive sector 
experiencing the largest decline. The hospitality sector saw the strongest growth in the 
period 1995-2001 but this rate of growth was not maintained. All sectors have recovered 
to above pre-recession levels. Reliable data for thousand hours worked in not available 
for retail. Therefore, productivity for retail has been calculated using total domestic 
concept. 
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Figure 5: Retail Productivity 
 
 
 
Source: WERU on OECD 
 
Figure 5 shows productivity developments in the retail sector. Again this sector saw a 
slump as a result of the recession. Growth post-recession has been somewhat slow, with 
pre-recession levels being reached in 2014.  
In assessing productivity developments in the UK it is pertinent to examine the four areas 
focused on in this report. 
 
 
1. Pay and Reward 
 
Pay levels are not only determined by supply and demand in the labour market, but above 
all by productivity changes. Increases of productivity create higher levels of prosperity, 
which enables employers to pay more and enables unions to demand higher wage levels. 
Although the divide between wages and profits may highlight opposing interests of 
employers and workers productivity growth is, therefore, common ground. Since 1980s 
the UK has seen a dramatic decline in trade unionism and collective bargaining 
agreements and in the late 1990s the vast majority of employees working in the private 
sector had their pay determined by management rather than by trade unions (Brown et al. 
2002). Many authors (Godard, Delaney 2000; Machin, Wood 2005) have signalled that 
the decline in trade union influence, in the UK and elsewhere, coincides with an increase 
in the use of human resource management practices (HRM) as a new form of work 
organisation. Some argue that competitive pressures led managers to rethink and adopt 
new policies and strategies aimed at enhancing competitiveness, there has been a shift 
away from the job control model of unions to employer practices focused on cooperation 
0
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250
Retail	Productivity	=	GVA/total	domestic	
concept
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and participation (Kochan et al. 1986). Such practices involve flexible work, cross-
training, team work, different forms of performance-based pay and formal employee 
participation among others. These practices form what some authors call the high 
performance work systems (HPWS) and they argue that they should be adopted 
comprehensively in the workplace in order to increase firm performance (Huselid 1995; 
MacDuffie 1995). Although researchers have argued that unions can play an important 
role in the adoption of HRM practices (Marshall 1992; Cook 1994), advocates of HPWS 
view management as the primary actor in the employment relationship and see the 
adoption of appropriate managerial practices as a way of producing gains for employees 
and employers, suggesting a less salient role for collective bargaining (Godard, Delaney 
2000, 485). Guest (1989, 48) points out that organizations pursuing HRM practices are 
more likely to prefer a non-union environment and will emphasize individual rather than 
collective agreements.  
In high performance work systems great emphasis is placed on incentive pay systems to 
enhance motivation and performance in organisations (Holmstrom, Milgrom 1994; 
Ichniowski et al. 1997). Wood and Albanese (1995) demonstrated in their study that the 
adoption of merit pay, among other HRM practices associated with high performance 
work systems, increased in their sample of 132 manufacturing plants in the UK between 
1986 and 1990. Others found similar results in the analysis of the British Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey of 1998 and showed the rise of certain kinds of pay systems 
associated with HPWS (Millward et al. 2000). Wood (1996) examined the link between 
HRM practices and unionism in manufacturing industries in the UK and found no 
difference in the take up of high performance practices between unionized and non-
unionized workplaces. However, the author found that appraisal and merit pay are more 
likely to be used in non-unionized workplaces and the rate of change to HPWS between 
1986 and 1990 was also greater in non-unionized workplaces. 
Machin and Wood (2005, 205) argue that practices that are more likely to comprise 
alternatives to unions are those that can replace bargaining and voice roles. Individualized 
pay determination, such as merit or performance-related pay, and methods of 
communication to give workers a direct voice could, in theory, avoid the need for union 
involvement. However, the authors point out that these practices are unlikely to offer an 
alternative to unions. Pay awards for instance, may be subject to management bias, 
something that unions have historically tried to prevent. In their study, Machin and Wood 
(2005) test the link between HRM and unionization using bargaining and voice practices. 
They used data from the British Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations Surveys 
between 1980 and 1998 to found longitudinal changes in the union-HRM relationship. 
They concluded that HRM practices have not substituted unions in the workplaces and 
moreover, they found no greater adoption of HRM practices in non-union workplaces 
than unionized ones. 
Another study (Arrowsmith et al. 2008) examined the relationship between the retreat of 
collective bargaining in the private sector in the UK and growing emphasis on variable 
BARGAINING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 
22 
pay systems (VPS). Variable pay systems are identified as bonuses, including payment 
by results, merit pay or performance-related pay based on appraisals and profit-related 
pay, where employees share in the business success. Data from the 2004 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) shows an increase in VPS from 20% in 1998 to 
32% in 2004 and at the same time the proportion of workplaces covered by collective 
bargaining continued to decline. The authors investigated the use of such pay practices in 
banking and machinery and equipment industries and found that variable pay, in its 
different forms, operates at more levels in the banking companies, whereas machinery 
and equipment companies operated more collective forms of variable pay, such as profit-
related pay. They found that collective bargaining can embrace variable pay systems 
through negotiations in basic pay increases to at least match the cost of living. In the 
machinery and equipment companies unions responded with preferences for objective 
rather than subjective measures of performance and were not necessarily opposed to VPS, 
as some schemes may improve company viability and consequently employment security. 
Arrowsmith et al. (2008, 3) conclude that the introduction of variable pay systems has not 
undermined collective bargaining, since its focus is on delivering inflation-based 
increases in pay. Nevertheless, the proportion of employee earnings determined without 
collective bargaining has grown in these sectors. 
Pay practices have generated much interest in the academic literature in the past decades 
and have been embraced my many organizations in the private sector, as well as in parts 
of the public sector in the UK. Nevertheless, many of these incentive systems are 
concerned with levels of human application or input, rather than productivity outputs. 
Further research is needed to investigate how these pay practices are used to negotiate 
meaningful ways to increase productivity and performance in the workplace.  
 
 
2. Employee Participation and Voice 
 
Employee participation is often justified by psychological arguments, like the increase of 
motivation, commitment and loyalty as the main HR aspects, or moral and ideological 
aspects, like the striving for economic democracy and equality with regard to decision 
making, but there is also a strong case for the economic impact it may have. According 
to Levine and Tyson (1990) there is often a positive, but however small effect on 
productivity. The size and significance of the effect is according to them mainly 
contingent on the type of participation and on other aspects of the IR system in which the 
organisation operates (p. 183). Employee participation can be organised through quality 
circles and process improvement to decision making and the complex issue of the 
establishment of democracy, either through trade unions and works councils as form of 
indirect participation or by having a financial stake in the company or through direct 
ownership of corporations (co-operatives).  
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Empirical studies, like Addison and Belfield (2001), draw the conclusion that 
participation indeed improves the quality and efficiency of the use of company facilities, 
which is even more strongly the case with the introduction of new technology. In such a 
case, there is evidence of the acceptance of the new technology leading to a better use of 
it (see for evidence on the printing industry: Veersma 1992). Especially in the UK, there 
is a rise in the incidence and impact of various forms of employee participation, including 
non-union representation. All such forms of participation may have impact at various 
levels of the organisation: the shop floor, department, or plant- and company-level (for 
an overview see Strauss 1998). Again, employee participation could impact productivity 
in various ways. Motivation and satisfaction of employees, as possible outcomes of 
participation, will, most likely, impact levels of productivity, but, most directly, 
participation through input from employees may lead to improvements in the 
organisation, like through the improvement of the quality of decisions, as was found in 
earlier research on employee participation across European countries (Wilpert 1998, 62). 
Similar outcomes of research are found with the EPOC study, carried out by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Sisson 2000). 
In cases of social partnership, often built as a construct to fight economic threats – be it 
at the sectoral level or the company level – concession bargaining may be the driver. Such 
partnership schemes, with trade unions or other employee representatives involved such 
as works councils or Joint Consultative Committees, usually have an objective to cut costs 
and raise productivity levels. Productivity should however not be looked upon in isolation 
as an objective leading to improvements for all stakeholders. Productivity is often an 
overall aim for the improvement of the operating of an organisation with possible 
diverging effects on the interests of various stakeholders. Actually, for the employee 
interests to be served best having voice is the first requirement to enable a more balanced 
and equally divided share of the gains of the organisation.  
When looking at the impact of forms of employee participation, it is especially relevant 
to look at the reciprocal interaction between participation channels. Indeed, the issue of 
interaction between various channels of participation, like also with the operating of trade 
unions and collective bargaining, is an important one. MacDuffie (1995) points at the 
interaction effects that can be found between various human resource practices when 
looking at their impact at firm level. Similar effects can possibly be found between 
various forms of employee participation, like between major elements of modern HR and 
employee relations as elements of ‘bundles of HR practices’ and the role and impact of 
actors in more traditional industrial relations. 
 
 
3. Skills 
 
Trade Unions have used the learning and skills agenda as a way of recruiting and 
organising members and strengthening their presence in workplaces (Heyes, Stuart 1998). 
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Involvement in training was a crucial part of union’s bargaining position during the 1980s 
when the Conservative Government introduced legislation that supressed trade union 
rights to take collective action in the form of strikes and further isolated them by reducing 
involvement in policy making and, in some cases, the derecognition of recognised Unions 
in the workplace (the Employment Act 1982 and the Trade Union Act 1984). The Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) continued the development of Unions as actors in the learning 
agenda through their Bargaining for Skills programme in the early 1990s (Wallis et al. 
2005), which was an attempt to not only address the lack of investment in training and 
development (Dundon, Eva, 1998), but also to reconsider collective bargaining 
approaches through the skills agenda (ibid.). This was then followed by the New Labour 
Government in 1997 committing to the Lifelong Learning Agenda, with the development 
of National Advisory Group for Continuing Education and Lifelong Learning 
(NAGCELL), the Skills Task Force (STF) and the Skills Alliance (ibid.). The 
introduction of these organisations opened the door for Unions to work in partnership 
with employers to identify and offer training opportunities for employees (including trade 
union members), enhanced further by the establishment of the Union learning Fund 
(ULF) in 1998 to support learning initiatives led by Unions in workplaces. The TUC 
report the link between the ULF and a positive economic impact: 
 
Workers who take part in training are likely to earn higher wages and are more likely to be 
in employment as a result of gaining qualifications. For the individuals who took part in 
union-led learning or training through ULF15, these benefits amounted to £470 million 
from higher wages and £110m as a result of being more likely to be in employment – a 
total of £580m. The net benefit to employers resulting from the greater productivity of a 
better skilled workforce (minus any output lost as a result of working time taken to engage 
in learning through the ULF) is estimated at £336m (TUC 2016a:6). 
  
The positioning of Trade Unions as serious players in the skilling of workers was 
legitimised by the statutory recognition of Union Learning Reps (ULRs) in 2002. 
According to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), there are 
currently 28,000 ULRs in UK workplaces (ACAS 2017). The role of the ULR is to 
provide union members with advice and guidance about learning opportunities (as well 
as indirectly promoting the benefits of union membership to non-members). Often that 
role is extended to include organising learning events in the workplace and negotiating 
with employers. According to Wallis et al., the Government, see ULRs as “a mechanism 
to raise employee demand for learning and support and complement employer workforce 
development strategies” (2005, 286), although it is worth noting that ULRs do not have 
the statutory right to be involved in consultation and bargaining for learning. This 
omission appears to be contradictory to evaluations by the Government on the success of 
the ULR/employer relationship; Munro and Rainbird note that “training must be viewed 
in the broader context of the employment relationship” (2004, 3).  
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4. Inclusion and Diversity 
 
The relationship between trade unions and equality can be summarised in several key 
themes: a historical neglect of equality, an increase of diverse trade union members, an 
increase in equality bargaining but few supportive structures to secure equality bargaining 
outcomes resulting in current uneven success at moving the equality agenda forward. 
With trade union membership becoming more diverse, the need for equality issues to be 
on bargaining agenda is more prevalent than ever. The TUC Equality Audit states that 
55% of union members are women, black/black British workers make up the highest 
group of workers in terms of union density while stats on LGBT and disability are 
incomplete as only 51% of unions ask members about disability status and 44% ask about 
LGBT status (TUC, 2014). 
Historically, trade unions were accused of failing to represent the interests of a large 
proportion of their members and have been slow to respond to take action on equality 
issues (Colgan, Ledwith 2002; Milner 2017). Colling and Dickens (2001) report that 
collective bargaining agreements often formalised and extended tacit discrimination in 
the trade union movement. Currently, unions attempt to address equality issues but their 
success has been uneven and patchy (Bacon and Hoque, 2012; Milner 2017). 
In response to poor equality outcomes in unions, separate trade union groups were 
organised to represent minorities; self-organization. Self-organising created a separate 
space in trade unions for union members to organise on the basis of their shared 
characteristics. Humphrey (1998), believes these groups have failed to thrive. Other 
scholars argue that these groups have been a success and allowed minority groups to bring 
issues of specific concern onto the union agenda (see Colgan, Ledwith 2002); Parker 
2002). 
Today literature points to a turnaround in the equality agenda of unions. Colgan and 
Ledwith (2002) report three causes for a turnaround in equality issues in unions. The first 
factor is the change of composition of union membership. They state that the presence of 
black, disabled and LGBT members pushing for change in UK union cultures, agendas 
and structures has resulted in equality being taken more seriously (Bradley et al. 2000; 
Colgan, Ledwith 2002). Secondly, the presence of equality activists has pushed forward 
change which has improved equality representation. Thirdly, an acknowledgement that 
trade unions are historically inept with regard to equality and that there is democratic 
deficit in trade union structures has led to an improvement in equality (Colgan, Ledwith 
2002).  
A further potential source of turnaround in equality issues in trade unions is equality 
bargaining. Equality bargaining, as coined by Dickens (1989), amounts to the collective 
negotiation of issues that are of interest to women or measures that will facilitate gender 
equality. This concept of equality bargaining is still widely used today but must move 
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beyond the idea of gender to encapsulate other protected characteristics under the 
Equality Act 2010, such as race, disability and sexual orientation.  
The coverage and outcomes of equality bargaining are particularly patchy, with research 
stating that equality bargaining is affected by the recession (Briskin 2014) where 
economic concerns take precedent over equality issues (TUC, 2016b). One example is 
the Communication Workers Union (CWU) there are reports that management see 
equality as an easy target in harsh economic climates (Milner, Gregory 2014). Union 
structure itself can affect equality bargaining. For example Milner and Gregory (2014) 
exhort the importance of who is involved in bargaining as a determinant of whether 
gender equality gets to the bargaining table; if women are bargaining then equality 
bargaining is more likely to occur, known as representational democracy (Briskin 2014; 
Blaschke 2015). Other important factors that facilitate effective equality bargaining are 
centralized bargaining systems; high bargaining coverage and union density, democratic 
structures, feminists in the union movement and legislation that is supportive (Briskin 
2014; Williamson 2012). One pertinent example of equality bargaining arose as a result 
of equal pay claims in Leeds City Council in 2009. Bin men were faced with a salary 
decrease of £4,500 due to an equal pay review which placed them at the same skill level 
as catering and canteen staff who earned £4,500 less. As result strikes ensued and the case 
closed with Leeds City Council dropping the pay cuts and instead engaging in 
productivity agreements (Oliver et al. 2014). 
Under the Labour government the Unions Modernisations Fund (UMF) was introduced 
which created a role for an equality representative. Currently, 22% of unions have 
provision for general equality rep in their rule book, while many other unions encourage 
this role on a volunteer basis (TUC 2016b). Equality representatives are union officials 
who are trained to deal with equality issues. Despite this novel role, the success of the 
equality reps is uneven. Many report having little time to devote to equality issues as they 
are simultaneously working in other union roles and as they are not entitled to paid time 
off to carry out their roles, they are highly pressured (Bacon, Hoque 2012). 
Alongside the need for equality bargaining and equality reps is the necessity to focus on 
the role of the business case for equality. Often it is the presence of a business case for 
equality that gets equality onto the bargaining table. Equality measures are taken in 
response to the idea that equality will serve organisational interests, rather than just 
address social fairness or comply with the law (Colling, Dickens 1998). In particular, a 
study of diversity management in HPWS found that diversity practices were correlated 
with higher labour productivity, innovation and a reduction in employee turnover 
(Armstrong et al. 2010).  
The three key themes of a historical neglect of equality, an increase of diverse trade union 
members, and an increase in equality bargaining but few supportive structures to secure 
equality bargaining outcomes, resulting in current uneven success at moving the equality 
agenda forward, point to a difficult environment in which to secure equality gains. It is 
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likely, therefore, that in each of the four sectors equality will be marginalised due to 
austerity and economic pressure. 
 
28 
 
 
 
Section 4. 
Analysis of economic and legal policies 
on labour productivity 
 
 
The productivity enigma has become particularly noticeable since the economic and 
financial crisis of 2008 onwards whereby the Conservative dominated Governments have 
pursued a programme of fiscal austerity while giving encouragement – explicit and tacit 
– for wage suppression for both public and private sector workers. In the public sector, 
the logic has been clear: that ‘necessary’ restraint on public expenditure means restraint 
on wages. In the private sector, where in the absence of any co-ordinated industrial or 
labour market policy, the Government has little power to intervene. However, the 
continuing (relatively) poor productivity statistics have apparently given mandate to 
private sector employers to suppress wages below inflation with the logic that poor output 
does not justify higher pay. 
In response to such productivity problems, the Conservative government, under Theresa 
May, has promoted a ‘strong’ industrial policy at the heart of its economic policies (Harari 
2017). The Government strongly links increased productivity to the UK’s overall 
prosperity and a rise in living standards (Harari 2017). Earlier, in 2015, the Government 
also noted that weak productivity needed to be addressed in its productivity plan Fixing 
the Foundations: Creating a More Prosperous Britain. The plan includes a two pronged 
approach of improvement in long term investment and the creation of a dynamic economy 
(HM Treasury 2015). Opposition parties criticised this plan based on the notion that skills, 
investment and infrastructure are not in place to enable a rise in productivity. To put it 
differently, people are already working hard, but the infrastructure to turn their hard work 
into high productivity is absent. The Labour opposition stated that, to address this issue, 
a more radical productivity plan is needed (Harari 2017). Indeed the Business, Innovation 
and Skills Select Committee agreed that the new Conservative plan was a summary of 
existing policies rather than a new plan (Business Innovation and Skills Committee 2016).  
Employers Associations, such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), are 
supportive of the plan and value the commitment from the Conservatives to deliver the 
plan based on the reduction in corporation tax (Harari 2017). In contrast, the trade union 
movement has been critical of the plans stating that the Government has failed to address 
long term underinvestment. In a similar vein the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
Development reported that there are insufficient measures to support skill development 
(Harari 2017). The response of Unite, a large general union, points to the need of a 
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collaboration between all partners to solve the UK’s productivity problem where unions 
are representative of millions of employees (Earls 2015).  
Rather than developing a long term strategy for the workforce, the Government’s 
commitment to austerity is suffocating productivity (Earls 2015). The TUC (2015) reports 
that productivity is weak in the UK due to demand being weakened by austerity, which 
has been made worsened by insecure household income in the UK. There has been a rise 
in insecure employment such as zero hour contracts and fixed term contracts (Brinkley 
2013). In fact there has been increased competition for jobs in the lower half of the market 
as a result of increasingly stringent welfare to work regimes and the amount of workers 
whose wages are determined by collective bargaining agreements has fallen (Forth 2014). 
The solution to the productivity puzzle, as promoted by the TUC, IMF and OECD, is an 
increase in demand, which is not possible in an environment of austerity (TUC 2015). 
Sisson (2014) argues a similar case where instead of employees working longer hours, 
the focus should be on employees working smarter. The UK’s proportion of workers who 
work more than 48 hours a week is already one of the highest in Europe. 
Smarter working, taking advantage of training and investment is, however, less likely to 
occur in an economy of austerity. Contrary to the findings of and Sisson (2014), national 
policies are more in favour of a managerialist agenda of austerity and financialisation 
rather than building support among actors of industrial relations to encourage a broader 
skill development and building trust. The last mentioned can only be found as far as 
European level policies are concerned. 
The most pertinent areas of this type of legislation is ICE Regulations. After the Directive 
on European Works Councils (EWC) the European Council of Ministers accepted another 
piece of legislation on works councils: the ICE (Information and Consultation of 
Employees) (Directive 2002/14/EC). This created the first legislation impacting national 
level employment relations as a framework of statutory rights for employees to be 
informed and consulted by their employer on key issues affecting the workplace and the 
work organisation. The legislation was introduced in the UK on 6th April 2005 for 
companies with over 150 employees and by 2008 it covered organisations with over 50 
employees. This is, like the Directive on EWCs, another milestone in the spread of 
legislation on the right of information and consultation, reflecting the emphasis of the 
European institutions to develop social dialogue as the dominant way of decision making. 
The legislation was much slower to be introduced in the UK than in other member states 
of the EU. Employers, organised by the CBI, had always been most opposed to both 
pieces of legislation. Before the Directive on EWCs was adopted they claimed that it 
would slow down decision making and it would harm employment relations as it would 
be more likely to disrupt relations between the employer and employees as trade unions 
would have a say on policy making of business. With regard to the ICE regulation the 
CBI held similar opinions and they feared it could be damaging for business. The TUC 
was strongly in favour of the new legislation and lobbied the Government for it to be 
implemented. The Government at the time (formed by Labour) however did not seem to 
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view information and consultation as a priority. The implementation of it was far more 
flexible than in other countries and shows more signs of the voluntary tradition of British 
employment relations and left a large degree of flexibility to what could be considered 
the operating of works councils – what originally would be the blueprint for ICE 
regulatory bodies. Although in most member states employees are involved in triggering 
the setting up of a works council, in the UK there is a mechanism which prescribes that 
at least 10 percent of the employees have to formally request the rights of information 
and consultation. The regulation would also allow pre-existing arrangements to continue 
as long as they are approved by employees – like the voluntary agreements according to 
Article 13 with the Directive of EWCs. Employers who do not follow the regulations 
could be fined by the Employment Appeal Tribunal to a maximum of £ 75.000. 
In practice, works councils do not operate across the UK – certainly not when compared 
to works councils like they operate across the continent not only having more extensive 
rights, but also having more a reputation and gaining much more recognition from 
employers who value their input into decision making and their contribution to 
employment relations in general. Trade unions deal with ICE in different ways and often 
they would act as a local branch of the trade union and in many cases bodies of 
information and consultation are labelled Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs), which 
means they would not have real voice and would be less representative regarding 
employees than most works councils across the Continent. It will be no surprise that trade 
unions would be rather sceptical of the value of works councils as they could be a threat 
to their position (Hall, Purcell 2012). Social partnership is, therefore, not involved with 
practical experiences of ICE and the 10 per cent threshold would also act against a further 
dissemination of works councils (IPA 2015). Hall et al. (2015) conclude that there would 
be a problem with the sustainability or embeddedness of JCCs despite the ICE 
regulations. Van Wanrooy et al. (2013) found on the basis of the WERS data only 13 per 
cent of workplaces to which ICE would be applicable had JCCs in 2011 (p. 61). In sum, 
the implementation of ICE regulation across the UK has been patchy, not well supported 
and, if in place, is very limited in terms of decision making and power sharing to say the 
least. 
The second piece of relevant legislation is the Trade Union Act 2016, which is driven by 
the urge of Government to restrict the potential of trade unions. The Trade Union Act 
received royal assent in May 2016 and was hotly contested by trade unions across the 
country. The main impact of the Trade Union Act 2016 will be to reduce trade unions’ 
capacity to take industrial action. Importantly, in order for a strike to be classed as legal 
two conditions must be met. Firstly, a minimum of 50% of members entitled to vote must 
vote in the strike ballot and secondly if the strike is to take place in an important public 
service industry then additional criteria exists. In this situation at least 40% of those 
members who voted must be in favour of the strike action (HM Government 2016). 
While the TUC managed to negotiate a number of changes to the proposed bill, the 
passage of the Bill is still seen a direct challenge to the power of workers to take industrial 
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action (Moss 2016). The Act allows, for example, for employers to hire agency workers 
in the event of a strike, which was banned in the UK since 1973. Importantly, the notice 
an employer needs prior to a strike has been doubled from 7 days to 14 days. This 
increased notice period allows an employer more time to hire agency workers. While 
proponents of the Act say it protects the UK economy and workers from undemocratic 
industrial action (BBC 2015), others believe it has been introduced to weaken trade 
unions and the Labour Party (The Guardian 2016). 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This research is based upon four descriptive and evaluative case studies, one in each 
industry in the UK; automotive, healthcare, hospitality and retail (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Sample composition 
 
 
 
The initial stage of the research included secondary data analysis. Firstly, an academic 
literature review was conducted which explored productivity and the way in which 
productivity agreements have impacted employment relations and shop floor 
management in the past decades. Secondly, legislation and public policies that impacted 
upon productivity were analysed. The focus of the analysis of legislation and public 
policy documents was on employee participation, strategies of government and social 
partners regarding skilling, diversity and inclusion and pay. The combination of 
legislative, public policy and academic literature analysis resulted in in-depth knowledge 
of the context and historical background of the current situation with regard to 
productivity.  
The project included primary data collection in the four sectors detailed above. The cases 
studied form a purposive sample and four key themes were explored. In each sector 
Industry Automotive Healthcare Hospitality Retail
Mid$skilled)
Mixed)Capital$
Labour)intensive)
Mid$skilled)
Labour)intensive
Low$skilled)
Labour)intensive
Low$skilled)
Labour)intensive
Organizations
Multinational)
with)large)
manufacturing)
plant)in)the)UK
National)Health)
Service
Largest)operator)
of)hotels,)
restaurants)and)
coffee)shops)in)
the)UK
British)
multinational)
grocery)and)
general)
merchandise)
retailer
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background documents were analysed but existence and availability of collective 
agreements was limited, therefore the project could not include a content analysis of these 
documents. Next a selection was made of companies or organisations where relevant data 
can be obtained with regard to productivity and the way in which it is impacted by social 
partners. In each sector one or two organisations were chosen to interview social partners, 
management, HR and employees. The selection of respondents was slightly different 
between the various organisations as the nature of the organisations permits different 
actors to be more dominant impacting the productivity agenda. 
In total, nine interviews were conducted with HR, employers and trade union 
representatives. The research team in the UK developed a semi-structured interview 
schedule with pay and reward, organisation and skills, voice and participation and 
inclusion and diversity as the core topics of the research interview. In practice, the focus 
of the interview could be different depending on the role and position of the respondent 
and the type of information they could provide. Interviews took place between March 
2017 and May 2017; they lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and were recorded with the 
consent of participants. Field notes were produced after each interview to identify 
emerging themes. The cases were transcribed in a standardized format eliciting common 
or conflicting experiences. After transcription the interviews were subject to complete 
coding and codes were organised into primary and secondary themes. These themes were 
then used to ascertain the role of the social partners, labour productivity and collective 
bargaining. Occasionally, divergent narratives could be found where information was 
further verified and complemented so the analysis would represent varying views and 
experiences. 
The methodology adhered to the Social Research Association Ethical Guidelines based 
on voluntary participation; informed consent; confidentiality and anonymity. 
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Part A. 
The Retail Sector 
 
Articulation of collective bargaining – Multi-employer or sectoral bargaining - has 
become something of a rarity in the private sector of the UK labour market, where union 
membership density and collective bargaining (CB) coverage have fallen to a low level 
(Emery 2015). CB at sectoral level in retail ceased in the late 1980’s and it now occurs 
only at company level in a minority of enterprises. Union density in the retail sector is 
12.7% and the percentage of employees’ pay affected by collective agreement is 15.6% 
– figures include wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, 
(Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2016). 
The retail sector has a predominance of small businesses, a high percentage of women 
and young workers, extensive part-time work and low wages. These trends also explain 
the traditional low trade union density in the sector in many countries and the weakness 
of collective bargaining in terms of effective regulation of employment conditions 
(Caprile 2004). 
This section presents a case study of Tesco, a large British multinational grocery and 
general merchandise retailer employing just over 335,000 people in the UK. The 
collective agreement is a single-company, single-union agreement between Tesco and 
Usdaw, the main union for retail workers. The Usdaw-Tesco ‘partnership agreement’ was 
launched in 1998 and is the largest private sector agreement in the UK. Usdaw is the sole 
union recognised by Tesco for the purpose of representing and negotiating for Tesco staff. 
The agreement applies to all Tesco staff (union and non-union members) except managers 
above Section Manager level. It is reviewed and negotiated annually and contains 
agreements on pay, bonuses, as well as all other major areas of employment policy and 
practice, including grievance and disciplinary procedures, use of employment contracts, 
working time and sick pay.  
The following sections contain information extracted from interviews with employee 
representatives and the Usdaw-Tesco partnership agreement document. 
 
 
1. Pay and Reward 
 
Tesco has a profit-related pay system for employees. All employees, including general 
assistants on the shop floor receive a bonus based on the financial performance of Tesco. 
If the company meets its targets they will then award a percentage of employees’ salaries 
as a bonus. General assistants are hourly paid and managers, senior managers etc. are 
salary paid. 
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Employees used to receive only shares from Tesco. They were allowed to sell their shares 
after one year and if shares were sold between 1-3 years they would pay tax and national 
insurance (NI). After three years they would be tax and National Insurance free. In 2012 
USDAW and Tesco worked on a new scheme for employees. Many of the employees 
wanted to receive the money rather than the shares. They then had the option to receive 
their bonus in cash or in shares. Since 2012, if employees choose shares they have to wait 
three years to sell. If they sell between 3-5 years they pay NI and tax on it and only after 
five years the shares are NI and tax-free. Nevertheless many employees prefer their bonus 
in cash, paid in June every year. 
 
 
2. Voice and Participation 
 
A distinctive feature of the partnership is the strong participatory framework for Usdaw 
local union representatives. Representatives are elected for all Tesco stores and they have 
clearly defined responsibilities at local, regional and national forums. The partnership 
agreement provides time off for union representatives to attend meetings and training 
outside the store.  
Forums are one of the many ways employees and managers can discuss issues and get 
involved in the wider business. Employee representatives interviewed said that these 
Forums are an important engagement and communication channel that ensure the voice 
of employees is heard and represented at all levels. Employees attend the Forums as 
Forum Reps, representing the views and interests of all employees. During the Forums, 
reps receive information on the business, share ideas for improvement and jointly 
problem-solve store and business issues. Interviewees explained that there are three 
Forum levels. The Forums have different names depending on the format: Level 1 – Store 
Forum, Level 2 – Store Director Forum and Level 3 – National Forum. 
The Store Forum takes place four times a year and it aims to improve ways of working, 
making jobs simpler and helping employees to improve the shopping experience of 
customers; to identify ways to safeguard the health and safety of staff, customers and 
communities; to jointly solve issues through practical solutions; to communicate to 
employees on business matters, such as updates on the business’s performance and 
briefing upcoming initiatives; to ask employees for feedback and ideas on new initiatives, 
to ensure they are effective, successful and sustainable; to help employees to understand 
the business need for change, and support and communicate this in store; to select/elect a 
rep or reps from the Store Forum to the Store Director Forum. 
The agenda for the Store Director Forum is similar to that of the Store Forum but also 
includes an update from the Lead Area Organiser, the National Forum Rep and any 
Working Party members. At the Store Director Forum, any issues that were not resolved 
at the Store Forum are discussed and worked through, in order to find a solution. Any 
issues that cannot be resolved at this level are escalated to Tesco’s Support Office. If the 
UNITED KINGDOM 
35 
issue cannot be resolved in the office, it will then be escalated to the Retail Directors. If 
the matter is likely to have national significance, the Lead Area Organiser and Group 
Personnel Manager will pass the details on to the Employee Relations team and Usdaw’s 
National Officer who will jointly determine if the issue should be escalated for discussion 
with Usdaw and the National Forum 
The National Forum operates at the widest level of the Partnership, to ensure the voice of 
employees is represented and heard at the highest level within the company. The National 
Forum agenda covers the priorities of Tesco, Usdaw and employees. The agenda will 
look at topical areas, often asking reps to work on joint projects to develop 
recommendations for improvements. At the National Forum, national issues that affect 
the company, employees and Usdaw are discussed and debated. National Forum Reps are 
consulted and briefed on long-term strategic planning, board decisions and initiatives that 
are due to launch into stores. When proposing changes to the employment package, 
National Forum Reps will be part of the decision-making process. 
 
 
3. Work Organisation and Skills 
 
This organisation is one of the leaders on innovation, bringing new technologies and new 
ways of running the stores. Employees receive training for every new equipment or 
procedure implemented in stores. Union representatives are informed of changes 
happening in the organisation and in the stores and are asked about anything that might 
be necessary, at store level, before implementation takes place. 
 
 
4. Inclusion and diversity 
 
Employee representatives interviewed at Tesco mentioned several initiatives in the 
workplace on inclusion and diversity issues. A lot of work has been done in partnership 
with USDAW to raise awareness of women’s health for example. Tesco also supports a 
range of employee networks to support and develop their employees. For example, the 
Women in Tesco network that promotes gender diversity and a culture of inclusive 
thinking to encourage women to share their views and articulate how they add value to 
the organisation; the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex employee 
(LGBTI) network with over 2,000 members in the UK acting as a confidential advice 
service for all employees; the Black Asian Minority Ethnic network where employees are 
encouraged to connect with colleagues across the business and share their experiences 
and understand how they can progress their careers in the organisation. 
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Part B. 
The Hospitality Sector in the UK 
 
According to EurWORK, the European Observatory of Working Life (2012), the 
hospitality sector is a labour intensive sector, dominated by small businesses and 
characterised by low levels of affiliation to employer organisations and trade unions. 
Unionisation in the hospitality sector is rare, where global hotel chains are openly hostile 
to ‘any form of regulation or collective bargaining on behalf of the workforce’ (Unite 
ND, 4). Working conditions in the sector can be very different from those in other service 
industries. Employment in this sector tends to be dominated by young people and females 
(EurWORK 2012).  
This section will focus on a case study of ‘Company Z’ (CoZ), which is the parent 
company of many hospitality outlets in the UK and one of the biggest hospitality 
employers in the UK. 
At CoZ, a worker’s contract will clearly state that there are no collective agreements with 
regard to their employment. CoZ does not stand alone in this regard, it is common to have 
these contract clauses in the UK hospitality sector. In addition, there are no formal trade 
union recognition agreements. An employer’s organisation exists in the hospitality sector 
– the British Hospitality Association (BHA), which is an umbrella organisation for 
employers and CoZ have representatives on the board. According to a senior union officer 
the BHA do issue specific union avoidance advice to their members.  
 
 
1. Pay and Reward 
 
In terms of pay and reward CoZ offers its employees a range of monetary and non 
monetary ‘perks’. In the UK, it is generally accepted that customers will ‘tip’ employees 
in reward for good service and this tip has increased the hourly rate to a reasonable 
amount of pay. However, since the introduction of the 12% service charge system in some 
hospitality outlets, customers have been paying this charge, which does not always go 
directly to employees. On the contrary, overall the amount of earnings for various groups 
of employees has decreased – certainly when taking into account the rise of the costs of 
living. 
At CoZ, there is no formalised pay system in place: employees are given a company 
loyalty card which would entitle them to 10% off refreshments or hotel rooms at one of 
the daughter companies. Points can be accrued through the loyalty scheme by receiving 
positive feedback from a customer, and the longer you have been employed by the 
company, the more points you can accrue. One daughter company offers a ‘star rating’ 
system: if a customer gives positive feedback, that member of staff receives a star and 
UNITED KINGDOM 
37 
also points for their loyalty card. Accumulation of stars leads to a reward such as sweets, 
but not a financial bonus.  
Performance and productivity are monitored and managed through systems that are meant 
to control labour and the production process. Social partners reported that the work is 
ever more intensified and the number of outputs creep up gradually as productivity 
demands on housekeepers increase. For example, an employee could be tasked with 
cleaning 10 or 12 rooms in an eight hour shift and this could suddenly increase to 18, 19 
or 20 rooms a day. Management set these targets without consideration of their feasibility. 
If employees are not able to meet these requirements they may be told at the end of their 
shift to stay and finish the allocated number of rooms. In this instance, employees do not 
always get paid for the overtime taken to meet set targets. The burden can be placed on 
the employee to increase their output, but there is no positive financial incentive for this. 
 
 
2. Employee Participation and Voice 
 
Currently, the social partners report that there are no formal mechanisms for employees 
within CoZ companies to have a voice in negotiations or bargaining. In the near future, 
however, this lack of voice may change in response to wider union campaigns in the retail 
sector which are influencing the hospitality sector. There is scope for some voice through 
Hospitality Action, which is a charity that runs an employment assistance helpline, which 
supports hospitality workers. The social partners believe this channel could be the only 
mechanism for employees to voice concerns around their employment.  
While direct employee voice seems sparse, employee rights are being supported through 
CoZ’s engagement at the ‘foundation stage’ of the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), which 
is a leading alliance of companies, trade unions and NGOs promoting respect for workers’ 
rights around the globe. The vision behind this initiative is to create a world where all 
workers are free from exploitation and discrimination, and enjoy conditions of freedom, 
security and equity (ETI 2017). The initiative also states that the freedom of association 
and the right to collective bargaining should be respected and, most explicitly workers, 
without distinction, would have the right to join or form trade unions of their own 
choosing and to bargain collectively’ (ibid.). In the interviews the trade union 
representatives felt CoZ was focusing more on applying this initiative to its supply chain 
than its own employees.  
In summary, it appears that consultation with employees about their working practices is 
scarce. In the case of CoZ, according to a trade union officer, employees do not have any 
say in their workplace. These employees are also not consulted about the nature of their 
work, nor the nature of their employment. According to the trade union officer this 
situation is unlikely to change – even after full ETI membership. 
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3. Skills 
 
Some employers have engaged with the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda, 
and have produced comprehensive documents. CoZ has a CSR programme, ‘Good 
Together’, which is about the way they work with their team members, customers and 
suppliers. The programme focuses on recruiting the right people and having a positive 
impact on the local community. 
One of the major developments in the hospitality sector, in recent years, has been the 
automation of work; for example using an electronic device to record a customer’s order 
in a restaurant or the ‘self-check-in’ machines in hotels. In general, investment in skills 
development in this sector has been about increasing productivity through automation of 
parts of the job.  
CoZ has an online training manual, Academy Online, which is a self-directed study which 
employees do in their own time and are not paid for. The courses are often linked to the 
introduction of new technologies and employees may participate to find out how to 
operate systems such as the ‘process data quickly’ (PDQ) card machines. According to a 
trade union officer, some of the higher end companies will give their staff proper training 
and development but it is always geared towards what is good for the business rather than 
what’s good for the staff. 
Unions have been trying to promote the training that hospitality workers, and employers, 
can benefit from, such as English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), numeracy 
and literacy qualifications. ESOL is particularly relevant as many hospitality workers are 
migrants. This is one area where unions have had some successes, when working either 
directly with employers of facility management companies. Such a change has only been 
achieved after two years of campaigning, after which trade unions finally made an 
agreement about acquiring access to employees and doing some joint projects with 
employers on topics like health and safety and ESOL. 
The developments on skilling in the sector appear to be, at least, very limited and, at best, 
focused on organisational needs, we may conclude. Although trade unions are rather 
active on this topic they find it hard to achieve changes with the fragmented structure of 
the sector and the largely unorganised nature of the labourforce in the sector.  
 
 
4. Inclusion and Diversity 
 
As mentioned previously, the hospitality sector has a diverse workforce; there are a large 
proportion of women and migrant workers employed in hotels, restaurants, bars and cafes.  
Unions have been campaigning for a number of issues that disproportionately affect 
women, such as the use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): this is, for example, 
about generic uniforms that are not designed to fit the shape of a woman’s body. Unions 
also produce bargaining policies that are designed to introduce elements of gender, 
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ethnicity and disability into collective bargaining discussions. This type of union policy 
has been viewed to be a positive move as often collective bargaining structures and 
policies are generic and tend to ignore that certain groups of employees may have 
different needs that should be addressed by union activity. The European TUC (ETUC), 
for example, suggests that women may have more caring responsibilities than men and, 
by including flexible working patterns on the collective bargaining agenda, it becomes 
less of a ‘women’s issue’ and part of the mainstream (ETUC 2007). 
Unions have Equality Reps at workplace level, who have a role in identifying equality 
issues and helping to make workplaces more equality aware. Each of the hospitality 
branches of the organising union in London has an equalities representative, so, for 
example, in the hotel workers branch a young woman has taken on the job of equalities 
rep and when lay members identify any equality issue, the equalities rep could get 
involved. 
However, the lack of a formal union recognition or bargaining structure is problematic. 
So, being an equality rep does not necessarily imply representation because the 
mechanisms for that are not in place for collective bargaining. In this context, the role is 
more a champion for equality and diversity within the industry and to promote best 
practice and to get trade union members to identify equality issues in their workplace.  
Sexual harassment can be a problem for workers, particularly housekeepers in the hotel 
industry. Women are often working on their own and may find themselves in a vulnerable 
situation when cleaning bedrooms. The Nordic Hotel, Restaurant and Tourism Industry 
has produced extensive research on this issue, exploring the power dynamics in 
hospitality, which has been of interest to UK unions organising in this sector.  
According to the Global Software Company, Fourth, who work with UK leisure and 
hospitality industries, women are now being paid marginally more than men in the 
hospitality sector (Fourth 2017). In March 2017, it was reported that on average women 
were being paid 2p per hour more than men, with the gender pay gap reducing by 21p 
since 2014 (ibid.). Interestingly, the report analyses the linking of pay rates for different 
jobs to the potential to ‘earn’ tips from customers in certain jobs, such as ‘front of house’ 
work, which they identify is often a role undertaken by women (ibid.). The implication is 
that a large segment of the wage is off-set by tips. So the wage for women may be higher, 
but this is reliant on customer tips, giving men a significant advantage in secure wage 
differentials. 
The analysis in this sector points to a sector with low unionisation levels and small scope 
to increase these levels in the near future. Key areas of concern lie around skills and 
increasing productivity targets. While some steps have been made at headquarter level, 
such as the Ethical Trading Initiative, these gains have not been translated onto the shop 
floor. 
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Part C. 
Health Care Sector Content Analysis 
 
The National Health Service (NHS) was created in July 1948 and is considered the envy 
of the world (Sullivan 2017). Based on three key principles the NHS was created to meet 
the population’s needs, be free to use and access would be based on clinical need and not 
the ability to pay (Delamothe 2008). While the NHS has stood the test of some 70 years 
of different political parties in power, its workers are subject to the most unique collective 
bargaining arrangements found in the UK. This section of the report investigates 
collective bargaining and productivity in the NHS, in the UK. The complications of 
categorising productivity and collecting data in the NHS, however, combined with the 
lack of attention paid to productivity in the UK means data is not collected on productivity 
in the NHS per se.  
The NHS is one of the five largest employers globally; it employs 1.3 million people 
(NHS Jobs 2017). Each of these 1.3 million employees, with the exception of doctors and 
dentists, are covered by a collective agreement, Agenda for Change (A4C). Agenda for 
Change has resulted in 100% collective bargaining coverage in the healthcare sector since 
2004 (EurWORK 2011). This 100% sectoral coverage stands in stark contrast to the 60% 
coverage for the public sector as a whole in 2015, based on Labour Force Survey statistics 
(BIS 2016). 
Agenda for Change provides a single and consistent system of job evaluation resulting in 
harmonised pay, grading and terms and conditions of employment (Sullivan 2017). 
Agenda for change covers topics such as redundancy pay, holiday entitlement, unsocial 
hours and sick pay. Agenda for Change leaves some scope for local negotiations around 
recruitment and retention premiums but the majority of negotiations are collectively 
bargained at national level, reports one senior organiser interviewed. 
Productivity in the NHS centres around streamlining processes to create more efficient 
patient care (NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 2009). The resultant 
“Productive Ward” mandate focuses on releasing time to care for patients, improved 
quality of care, improved patient safety, improved staff moral and financial savings 
through eliminating waste (NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 2009). Such 
strategies have resulted in £30,000 savings and 40% more time spent on direct patient 
care (NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 2009). 
In 2014, Lord Carter was tasked with a review to improve efficiency in hospitals, echoing 
the earlier Productive Ward mandate. The review included a Care Hours Per Patient Day 
(CHPPD) as a productivity tool to assess safe levels of staffing. Despite these measures, 
when social partners were interviewed about productivity in the NHS, the unequivocal 
view was that productivity in the NHS is side-lined for numerous reasons. A senior 
organiser for a general union reported that the nature of the job means there is always a 
question about what productivity means in the healthcare setting. What this suggests is 
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that while some attention is paid to productivity at government levels, its impact and 
effect ‘on the ground’ is minimal. 
The NHS Agenda for Change comprises multi-employer and multi union bargaining. This 
centralised structure is divided into two systems. One section deals with distributive 
bargaining; the pay and terms and conditions and a separate mechanism, the English 
Social Partnership focuses on integrative bargaining issues, more or less anything to do 
with workplace culture, bullying and harassment, any partnership issues, so domestic 
violence at work, and freedom to speak up or to have voice at the workplace. This type 
of collective bargaining system is very unique in the UK and one interviewee reports that 
it is modelled much more on a European system. They believe the system is based on 
working in partnership overall. While issues around pay and pensions have “got sticky”, 
overall it is a tripartite arrangement which works well.  
All social partners interviewed were very proud of what has been achieved through 
Agenda for Change. In particular, they were proud of the way Agenda for Change has 
been maintained in difficult political and economic climates. This commitment reflects 
the commonly felt need for focus on professionality in terms of quality of the process and 
care. 
 
 
1. Pay and Reward 
 
The A4C handbook outlines the rates of pay for each job as a result of an annual pay 
review body and job evaluations. These rates of pay are subject to change to comply with 
legislation. This system for determining the rate for pay is considered by the social 
partners to be a good process because all jobs are job evaluated and evidence is submitted 
to an annual pay review body. However, due to austerity measures in the UK, the social 
partners report a public sector pay cap which has determined rates of pay in the NHS.  
A key concern for all social partners was issues around the rate of pay for a job. Staff are 
recruited at several increments lower than the rate of pay for the job. It then takes staff 
several years to climb the increment scale to reach the rate of pay for the job. The result 
of the pay cap and the long increment ladders is staff disenchantment. Together the 
various unions are working to reduce the increment points at each pay scale so that staff 
reach the rate for the job earlier.  
Unlike other sectors, performance related pay (PRP) plays a marginal role in the NHS. In 
healthcare, PRP causes significantly more resentment than it solves, and it’s basically 
worked on a flawed premise that the motivator for staff in healthcare is pay, which is 
actually not the case. Some social partners reported that PRP creates resentment. In the 
widely held view in the sector, the government push for PRP would be counterproductive 
and reflects an ideological view on performance related pay. But, as it is pushed across 
the public sector, it is felt that it will be a matter of time before it will be attempted in 
healthcare. 
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2. Employee Participation and Voice 
 
Voice in the NHS is clearly separated between integrative and distributive bargaining. 
There is no role for non-union employee voice, when non-union voice bodies appear, the 
union is quick to dismantle them. The separation of the bargaining system into two 
discrete halves and the high density rate has led to the social partners to report that they 
are happy with current voice systems in the NHS. There is a positive relationship between 
the numerous unions and they work hard to achieve this environment. The majority of the 
social partners interviewed reported they feel the NHS employer-side values the A4C 
agreement and collaborates to keep the agreements in place.  
A challenge to the voice mechanisms, however, is the complex nature and number of the 
organisations who represent the employers. Further challenges in the future are expected 
to come from the Trade Union Act 2016 which curtails trade union’s abilities to take 
industrial action. Social partners reported concerns around these new regulations. 
 
 
3. Skills and Work organisation 
 
Currently, the major challenge facing the NHS in terms of skills is the removal of 
bursaries for healthcare professionals. Social partners report that removal of the bursaries 
will be “chaotic” based on the premise that you cannot work part time and do a nursing 
degree due to the placements that need to be completed.  
The separate unions have worked hard together to fight the removal of bursaries which 
they are framing as a workforce planning issue. There is currently a shortage of healthcare 
professionals and the unions are worried about the impact removing bursaries will have 
on the uptake of training places, which could further enhance the skill shortages faced by 
the NHS. 
Secondly, there has been lack of attention paid to the knowledge and skills framework, 
originally in the A4C documents. A lack of investment in skills was a key theme in all 
the interviews with reports of healthcare professionals undertaking CPD in their own time 
and at their own expense. It appears that only mandatory training is covered by employers. 
Alongside the need to fund CPD from staff’s own pocket, is the need to revalidate. 
Revalidation is a periodical process where a healthcare professional demonstrates they 
have maintained and developed their skills and competency. Revalidation becomes more 
complex in an environment where there is underinvestment in skills in terms of time and 
money. 
Despite the current challenges to the skill development of staff in the NHS, the social 
partners reported that the long incremental ladders at each grade build in targets as 
gateways to achieving higher incremental pay points. These gateways are supported by 
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clear job descriptions of the skills needed for each role. This clarity allows the employee 
to know their targets clearly and facilitates transparency in benchmarking. 
Overall, however, austerity has driven a marginalisation of the skills agenda and the 
impact of such cuts are feared by all social partners. 
 
 
4. Inclusion and Diversity 
 
Inclusion and Diversity concerns are mainly focused around gender, the gender pay gap 
and flexible working, which is particularly pertinent for a largely female workforce. A 
national officer reported that the pay gap will increase in importance due to legislative 
changes. Gender issues were a key driver for the Agenda for Change framework where 
all jobs are equality-proof through the job evaluation scheme. However, such job 
evaluations do not account for occupational segregation within the healthcare professions. 
Further gender issues are focused on long incremental ladders which disadvantage female 
workers and the need to revalidate which reduces the ability to return to work after 
absence from the labour market due to career breaks for mothers. 
At the micro level the social partners reported that ensuring implementation of the 
national agreement around flexible working is a key issue facing their members. The 
Agenda for Change supports part time and flexible working but there is a problem 
implementing these issues on the ground. Requests are placed and refused and staff 
members are not challenging this refusal. We can conclude that there is an issue of 
enforcement and monitoring when looking at flexible working and flexible work 
arrangements. Trade unions are keen to encourage members to seek to enforce their rights 
under Agenda for Change and believe that educating their members about their rights 
could encourage them to challenge poor local implementation. 
Alongside gender concerns are issues of racial (in)equality. Across the sector the removal 
of the bursaries could have a large impact on the diversity of new recruits into the 
healthcare professions. Removing the bursary is anticipated to have an impact on the class 
and race of new entrants to the profession. Only individuals who can afford to study 
without supporting themselves with a part time job is expected to create a reduction in 
racial diversity in the NHS. 
Further race equality issues centre around disciplinary action. A national officer of a 
specialist union reported that there are differences in the racial background of its members 
involved in disciplinary procedures. This area is likely to become more important and 
will receive special attention from this particular union in the future. Overall, race and 
gender are the key inclusion and diversity areas of concern for social partners in the NHS. 
In an austerity context, where bargaining is constrained by the need to lower unit cost, 
several key themes occur in the interviews with social partners. Firstly, legislation has a 
key impact upon the Agenda for Change and was a driver in its implementation to ensure 
all jobs were job evaluated for equality purposes. As legislation has filtered down from 
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the European Union, Agenda for Change terms and conditions have changed to ensure 
legislative compliance.  
The biggest challenge to the survival of the coordinated ‘Agenda for change’ is austerity 
and politics. Despite such a difficult environment, all participants reported that they were 
proud the agreement is still in place 13 years after its introduction. All parties work hard 
to ensure that the agreement does not unravel and think ahead to preserve the agreement. 
Nevertheless, workload issues, pay caps and lack of investment in skills remain key 
challenges for the trade unions and their members. 
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Part D. 
Manufacturing: Automotive 
 
The automotive sector used to be the heart of manufacturing in the UK, especially around 
the Midlands and in London (Ford Dagenham) where most companies were located. The 
industry has been through various rounds of restructuring over the last decades. In the 
1980s of last century many companies were closed down or were taken over. At the same 
time big Japanese companies invested in the UK: Nissan and Toyota. 
Toyota set up a manufacturing plant in Derby and an engine plant in Deeside, Wales. The 
main reasons for investment was expanding the market, being closer to Europe – actually 
still Europe at the time –, and to be able to produce without the tariffs and quotas 
regarding imports from Japan. Toyota employs now around 3000 employees and has been 
very successful with high performance and continuous improvement being the leading 
dynamics behind its production. At the moment of interviewing and writing this report 
article 50 of the Treaty of Rome has been triggered and will Brexit be negotiated. 
The uncertainty over Brexit and the type of outcome, in terms of being part of the Single 
Market and/or the Customs Union, overshadows the future of the company. Although 
some new investments in the plant have been announced in Toyota New Global 
Architecture platform, implying the building of various types of cars on the same 
platform, there is a lot of uncertainty. The low value of the Pound has already led to higher 
costs of import from suppliers. With the Brexit negotiations hanging over the future of 
British industry – with a hard Brexit leading to higher import prices and export tariffs 
being unavoidable – more uncertainty will impact the future position of British industry, 
including Toyota or, better, especially Toyota and in general the automotive sector as 
automotive companies generally outsource many activities and the main suppliers would 
be outside the UK. The company took therefore also a stand against Brexit before the 
referendum they send out – together with the trade union Unite – a letter stating the risk 
of Brexit. Nevertheless, in the region there was a majority of votes in favour of Brexit. 
Toyota employs about 2.500 employees at Derby (Toyota Manufacturing) and 500 
employees at the engine plant in Wales, totalling 3000 employees in total across the UK. 
The company started to operate in 1992 when large parts of the UK, and especially the 
Midlands, had little investment and the economy was suffering from a period of decline. 
The Thatcher government did not help to promote the position of trade unions. On the 
contrary, the position of trade unions was continuously under attack and employee rights 
were restricted. In this environment of a struggling economy and a limited influence of 
trade unions at company level they felt more a need to be involved with industry and to 
be recognised as a trade union when new industries started to set up a greenfield.  
Initially different unions would have approached Toyota in a ‘beauty contest’. The reason 
for winning the beauty contest by Unite would be that they would have promised 
concessions operating as a union, therefore operating as a union under conditions of 
concession bargaining when it comes to collective bargaining. The agreements Unite 
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agreed with would be operating like a company union being recognised as single union. 
This is in line with traditions of Japanese employment relations for which Japanese 
companies would also be critically looked at. There is a clear effect of Japanese traditions 
of industrial relations, but there is also a difference with Honda and other Japanese 
companies in the sense that there would be more openness to British traditions. Within 
management a clear change has taken place where the layers of upper management are 
gradually being replaced by British managers. A reflection of Japanese business culture 
is also the labelling of employees as members (of a family), which reflects more 
collectivist aspects of this culture. 
Over the years the union used the management philosophy, which is very much about 
involving employees in various decisions, to improve working conditions and moved 
away from the way it operated initially. At the start of operation of Toyota in the UK the 
trade union, Unite, would operate as a kind of works council, so also covering non-union 
employees: Toyota Member Advisory Board (TMAB). This has changed three years ago 
when Unite started to organise only their members and acted more like other trade unions 
across the UK. 
 
 
1. Pay and Reward 
 
This committee meets six times a year and is composed of thirteen union reps and six 
company directors and managers. They deal with the pay review as it is called: the pay 
negotiations. The average pay rise from 25 years ago, depending on the indicator used, 
would be 15 to 20% increase of pay. As a rule a period of seven years is looked upon. In 
2008, however, there was not any pay rise as the recession hit the company hard. With 
collective bargaining – pay reviews – other car manufacturers will be looked at as a way 
to compare and justify a certain pay rise. The main indicators for pay review are inflation 
levels and productivity improvement. On both sides of the table these indicators are used 
as it suits them best. The trade union, Unite, is always accused of cherry picking, but the 
management, it appears, will do the same. Performance is however more relevant than 
productivity agreements per se. Performance is looked upon in terms of continuous 
improvement (kaizen) and cost minimisation through improvement. These figures are 
handled in a strategic way as the basis for wage increases. 
The same applies to the level of the individual employee and their wage levels. Appraisals 
consist of performance related pay; each annual increase is dependent on the number of 
improvements proposed. With appraisals there is individual performance related pay. 
Each annual increase is dependent on the number of improvements proposed. A lack of 
proposals at the individual level leads to a decrease of the level of pay. 
The core is on pensionable pay, which is both what is agreed collectively and what is 
awarded to the individual. Bonuses come on top of that and are paid in cash without 
having an impact on the pension. 
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2. Employee Voice and Participation 
 
The trade union Unite operates, as stated, as a quasi ‘Works Council’; in the past also 
covering non-union employees. In the meetings with management the trade union would 
deal with various issues regarding collective agreements – pay reviews as they are 
labelled – and issues with regard to individual employees. Quality circles are organised 
to discuss problems in the work organisation analysing the backgrounds and, using 
various tools of problem solving, developing proposals for improvement. Such proposals 
may be small changes making huge cost cuttings when implemented at a large scale. In 
so called Conventions the leader of such a quality circle may be invited to present the 
proposed changes in front of a broad audience of colleagues. This may be nationally and, 
when the suggestion would have a broader impact on the production of Toyota, also 
abroad. 
Quality circles are a key element of the production, like in many Japanese companies, 
especially in the automotive industry and, even more, Toyota being the birthplace of the 
Toyota Production System (TPS) as the model for kaizen. The main objective is the 
continuous improvement and the optimisation of cost reduction and improvement of 
performance. Issues with regard to the improvement of working conditions can be part of 
the agenda and, as management is strongly in favour of a committed and highly motivated 
workforce, issues are most likely being taken serious and solutions would be looked for 
– possibly with the support of the union. 
The purpose of quality circles, as a form of direct participation, is clearly focused on the 
increase of efficiency and performance of the company. Quality circles have a leader – 
the supervisor – who has a more outspoken role as driving the participation and leading 
the activities and outcomes of it to a higher level within the organisation. There is 
however little concern from the side of the union. Activities and the role of quality 
management is clearly accepted as an integral part of the operating of the company. Even 
more, Unite appears to be a strong supporter of this type of participation as it is looked 
upon as in line with direct participation like through the union itself.  
 
 
3. Skills and skill development 
 
The majority of employees have a mixture of technical and broader managerial and soft 
skills. When entering the shop floor employees could be offered a job without any 
qualification. Most important is to be dexterous and being able to adjust to a certain speed 
of operations. When the company was just set up the speed of the line and the level of 
commitment was very much in line with the expectations of Japanese management. 
Employees would often stay until very late as they felt they needed to stay longer hours 
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than management in order to be valued as a member of the organisation. This has changed 
over the years, but there are still clear expectations with regard to commitment and efforts 
put in to improve the production organisation. The lack of formal qualifications would 
not be considered a problem. On the contrary, a career built around the requirements and 
needs of the organisation would be valued above the hiring of all-round workers.  
Skills are not discussed directly, but continuous improvement (Kaizen) plays a central 
role in evaluating the performance of the individual. Kaizen is organised in the form of 
QCs (Quality Circles) at the team-level of the organisation. During the week there is an 
hour or half an hour where the production is stopped for the whole shop. This time is used 
for the discussion of ideas for improvement.  
Training is at the heart of the organisation. Most of the training takes place in the form of 
on-the-job-training. As such this is integral part of the job. Also, other forms of training 
take place in the company, possibly in specifically designated lecture and seminar rooms. 
Training may concern specific skills with regard to the job, technical skills – like quality 
and maintenance – and management skills like leadership, communication and 
continuous improvement. 
 
 
4. Inclusion and Diversity 
 
Traditionally, the automotive industry has never been a very diverse industry – ‘boys with 
their toys’. At Toyota the overwhelming majority of the employees are male. This is 
different in the office where the majority is female. One senior union rep was interviewed 
who is female and who worked on the shop floor as a quality officer. She was clearly a 
huge exception. 
With regard to the pay gap between men and women it was reported there would not be 
a difference. On the contrary, white collar jobs are generally higher paid and therefore 
women carrying out this type of work they would even earn a higher wage than their male 
colleagues at the shop floor. When looked at chances for promotion it becomes however 
clear that there is a clear glass ceiling preventing women to reach the highest level of the 
hierarchy. This would be partly due to the effect of the male dominance in terms of 
technical expertise and partly to other, more diffuse mechanisms. 
The company aims to change this with a more inclusive culture. Women are encouraged 
to apply for a job and also in the union there seems to be a clear eagerness to promote 
more diversity within the company. According to a senior HR manager training is 
organised where managers are confronted with the narratives and stereotypes that may 
still exist, thereby preventing female employees being promoted to higher levels of 
management. To conclude, the need of diversity is felt as a very relevant topic for the 
future development of the organisation – also with regard to other aspects of diversity 
like LGBT and ethnic diversity –, but it is rather underdeveloped as a policy aspect. Both 
management and the union are however concerned about its improvement and show a 
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clear awareness of the urgency of this policy field. In a broader sense, the advantages of 
diversity are valued as it could enrich the organisational culture and bring more diverse 
perspectives to the work organisation. 
It is hard to generalise for the whole automotive sector in the UK. There are still some 
conclusions to be drawn. Productivity figures for manufacturing in the UK may be 
relatively poor; the automotive sector has its ups and downs but recently the automotive 
sector has been going through a phase of restructuring and improvement of the 
performance. Toyota is able to compete with many other car producers including with 
others in the same company. Bench marking is the major principle for performance but 
also for pay increases. For the sector as a whole in the UK, as well for Toyota, the future 
is however grim when looked at the potential impact from Brexit. Costs may be increased 
to a level that the competitive advantages of the companies do not outweigh the increase 
of costs of imports and the export tariffs, which would impact consumer demands on the 
continent. 
Collective bargaining is characterised by concession bargaining, which was especially 
reflected in the negotiations (pay review) during the recession in 2008. Wages were kept 
at the same level and concessions were made in order to protect the position of the 
company. In terms of industrial relations there is a different climate from other companies 
in the UK where Unite organises its members. The employment relations are – from the 
start of the company – built around the principle that adversarial relations, like were more 
common until the 80-ees in the last century, should be avoided. The ‘beauty contest’, 
which was the basis for the recognition of Unite as the only union, was implicitly a deal 
struck with the trade union at the start of their operating. The fact there has not been a 
strike in the plant since underlines the consensual way of making decisions regarding 
employment relations. 
In interviews with both unions reps and the management it was emphasised that 
employees are the core of the company and they are the backbone of what makes 
productivity. Whether it is kaizen or Just-in-Time, all organisational principles of the TPS 
are the core target of HR as they depend on contributions from the shop floor. In the view 
of Toyota productivity increase is primarily dependent on the work organisation. It is also 
striking how HR policies are geared towards aims that are more common across Japanese 
companies, like the development of employees through internal training and development 
rather than formal education. In the pay review productivity and inflation are the elements 
for pay rise. Especially over the most recent years, when the inflation was low, 
productivity increase still led to pay rises across Toyota UK. Skill development is, in line 
with the emphasis put on the need for organisational development, linked to group and 
individual bonuses, although they still make up a small part of the payment. 
As was mentioned by the senior HR manager, within Toyota, there is also a recognition 
of the regional demands. In terms of diversity, there is a lagging behind, but the targeting 
is in line with what is more typical for the UK and Europe more generally. Although the 
role of the union seems to reflect the Japanese model of having a company union, there 
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is a clear difference. The climate of employment relations is more in line with Japanese 
management, but other policies are more in line with UK employment relations, like the 
representation of union members only which is now the case since three years.  
The question that remains to be answered is whether the company is representative for 
the sector in the UK. At the start of the company, the main question for manufacturing 
was how to beat the Japanese and become more flexible, both through implementing a 
lean production and through continuous improvement. Since then there has been Japanese 
investment in the UK. Within Toyota as a whole the productivity is high compared across 
the company although clear figures are hard to obtain. This is the case even after taking 
into account the higher labour costs. 
In the meantime the Toyota principles – labelled as TPS – are more common for many 
industries, including service sectors. Car producers in the UK have been taken over by 
others and many are now either German (Rover) or Indian (Jaguar) – owned. TPS has set 
a standard, but the standard keeps on moving. Toyota is still ahead compared with other 
UK car manufacturers, but remains in many respects more a Japanese company than 
others. This is shown in career development, seeking harmonious relationships with 
employees and their unions and in the way quality circles operate. 
Developments in the sector are not only determined by productivity on the shop floor, but 
also by corporate governance and the way finances are dealt with. The high competition 
levels makes that companies aim to follow similar principles and are closely watched by 
their peers in the sector. Toyota, like many competitors, is therefore a major example how 
productivity comes in as a major principle for organisational development. Employment 
relations follow this principle, which makes a major difference compared to other UK car 
manufacturers. It is therefore save to conclude that Toyota is a good example for the 
sector regarding the first; in the other respect it remains an exception with clearly a hybrid 
mix of British and Japanese employment relations. 
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Section 5. 
Comparison of sectoral analyses 
 
 
Productivity figures have always been relevant for setting pay-levels. Basically, pay and 
profits are both led by productivity growth. Recent years have seen a slow growth of pay-
levels, with 2% per cent increase being the norm for the private sector and a 1 per cent 
cap on the pay increases in the public sector. With the decreased power and influence of 
trade unions and the low coverage of collective agreements in the UK there is, however, 
a limited countervailing power to the power of employers setting more unilaterally levels 
of pay. Only the automotive sector and the health sector are characterised by rather high 
levels of union membership with the last sector having a higher coverage of collective 
agreements. 
Although the situation at the labour market is very different, there is a similarity with the 
1970s where the low productivity levels were targeted with productivity agreements. Also 
currently there is a comparatively low level of productivity across the UK. In the 1970s 
this was the reason for setting up productivity agreements. Industrial relations and 
particularly the power of trade unions were blamed for low levels of productivity and the 
agreements concluded forecasted the strong trend to decentralised collective bargaining 
which took place from that time onwards. Although the impact on productivity is highly 
doubted the impact was most of all a different focus of industrial relations. 
Although the increase of productivity is clearly behind most collective bargaining – with 
the compensation for past inflation levels, there is now little evidence of productivity 
being targeted as explicitly. The main reason for this is the low levels of productivity and, 
as it was put by trade union representatives, depending on which ever is the highest, 
reference is made with collective bargaining to either inflation or productivity levels. This 
implies that inflation levels act more as a basis for wage increases than productivity levels 
as these show only a low increase across the economy. In individual companies there is 
however more evidence of productivity increase. As these figures are highly sensitive for 
competitive reasons there is little evidence of concrete figures. During and after the 
financial crisis of 2008 there is a clear tendency towards wage moderation, which led to 
some cases of a ban wage increase at all while productivity levels would have been 
enhanced. This is an incongruence which largely continues until this very moment where 
governments and employers only very hesitantly become more inclined to give up some 
of the most stringent moderation policies. 
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What became clear from the research is, however, that the pressure on labour costs leads 
to the decrease of costs through the intensification of labour – which also mentioned as 
the outcomes of earlier productivity agreements – and the flexibilisation of labour 
(hospitality) and outsourcing (healthcare). As some researchers concluded, productivity 
agreements used to have more a symbolic function in the past directly addressing the 
power of trade unions and the sclerosis of the economy to which this would be partly 
related. While productivity increase definitely plays a role in the automotive sector we 
found wage levels being more directly linked to quality management and improvement 
of processes in line with the principles of Japanese management. 
 
 
1. Pay and Reward Cross Sector Analysis 
 
A cross sector analysis of pay and reward in the four sectors – retail, automotive, 
healthcare and hospitality, demonstrates some common practices among certain 
industries, mainly in the private sector (Table 2). In the private sector, both automotive 
and retail, favour pay arrangements based on performance, whereas healthcare favours 
seniority pay, in line with most of the public sector in the UK. 
It is noted that employers in the Healthcare system place more importance on job 
evaluations and service-related pay to make pay decisions. According to interviews, 
performance monitoring is present but employees’ pay is not linked to performance, 
despite the move towards performance-related pay (PRP) in other areas of the public 
sector in the UK. Although in the automotive and retail industries performance-related 
pay is widely used, they differ in terms of types of schemes. In the cases studied in this 
report, the automotive company has an individual performance-related pay scheme in 
place where employees have their appraisal results linked to pay. Goals are agreed with 
employees and if met, employees receive a bonus award. Managerial discretion in pay 
decisions has increased in the past years in many sectors in the UK. Nevertheless, 
delegating authority for linking pay progression and performance to line managers works 
best where an organisation has in place a robust and trusted performance management 
system. 
In the retail case the pay scheme adopted is profit-related pay, where performance is 
measured at the organisational level. Employees receive an annual bonus based on the 
financial performance of the organisation. The Hospitality sector however is entirely 
different. Most employees in the case study are hourly paid with no formal pay 
progression system in place. Only a few reward schemes are in place, such as hotel and 
coffee discounts for employees. 
Another point of interest is the coverage of collective bargaining (CB) agreements in the 
different sectors. The Healthcare sector has a multi-employer and multi-union CB 
arrangement with 100% coverage (public sector average is 60%). Productivity focuses on 
quality of care, patient safety and cost savings by eliminating waste. In the Automotive 
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and Retail cases, collective agreements are at company level and trade union influence 
diminished over the years. This is even more prevalent in the case of Retail, where 
collective bargaining is present in only a small minority of organizations. The Retail case 
presented here has a single union and single company collective agreement arrangement 
and it covers all staff (union and non-union members). The ‘partnership agreement’ 
between the Retail company in this report and the trade union is perhaps one the best 
examples of CB still in place in the sector. The Hospitality sector lacks any form of 
collective representation or union recognition, despite the company presented in this 
report being the biggest hospitality employer in the UK. Looking at the range of collective 
forms of pay bargaining in this report, although not entirely absent, the central role CB 
played in pay determination is no longer the case, even in many parts of the public sector. 
 
Table 2: Pay determination in the four sectors 
 
Sector Manufacturing Retail Healthcare Hospitality 
Hourly pay    ✔ 
Seniority pay   ✔  
Pay by performance ✔ ✔   
Profit-related pay  ✔   
Individual performance-related 
pay (IPRP) 
✔    
Objective measures of 
performance 
 ✔   
Subjective measures of 
performance 
✔  ✔  
Collective bargaining ✔ ✔ ✔ None 
 
 
2. Skills and Skill Development Cross Sector Analysis 
 
The skills agenda has gained a lot of attention recently as productivity problems in the 
UK linger on. Both employers and the government are aware of the problems that could 
be caused by the lack of skills and the nature of the available skills. Trade unions 
attempted to use their lost power to gain more influence on the agenda for life long 
learning in order to find compensation for the loss of pay over the last years and 
stimulating the attention for employability and career development of employees. 
Apprenticeships and lifelong learning are being deployed to improve business and create 
a better and more adequately skilled workforce. We found evidence of this agenda but 
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there are limitations impacting the relative success of such policies – from the perspective 
of employers and the perspective of employees. 
 
Table 3: Skill trends 
 
 Manufacturing Retail Healthcare Hospitality 
Skills agenda     
Skills investment High Medium High Low 
Skills policies as long-term 
investment 
High Medium High Low 
Skills part of a broader 
employability agenda 
Selected job roles Limited High Low 
Is skills bargaining present? Focused on quality _ Professional 
needs 
_ 
Role of trade unions Lifelong learning Idem Idem _ 
 
In some sectors, especially hospitality, there is more a continuous emphasis on lowering 
labour costs and accepting lower training costs and therefore low skill levels. To put it 
differently, there is evidence of a low road to skilling in some sectors. In other sectors 
(health) there is a high demand and a strong wage moderation, but there is no evidence 
of a road towards a low wage/ low skilled economy. The reason being for this skilling as 
an answer to fulfil the needs of strategic objectives of business. These objectives may be 
defined broader than just enhancing efficiency and lowering costs, including labour costs. 
In the case of the hospitality sector we found evidence of Corporate Social Responsibility 
being targeted as a strategic objective. In order to maintain a better reputation and prepare 
for a global competition this is considered a relevant qualification for the workforce. In 
the automotive sector it was found that quality and continuous improvement are 
considered the levers for improvement of the competitive position within the sector. 
Although there has been some increase of investment in this sector in the UK over the 
last decades, the current Brexit negotiations cast a dark shade over this type of investment 
in the UK. There are still investments made, for example by Toyota, but there is little 
doubt that a negative outcome of the Brexit talks on import and export will impact most 
severely as the main market for car manufacturing is Europe rather than other regions in 
the world. 
It may be clear that, even more with this possibly posing a threat to the competitive 
position of manufacturing companies in the UK, the pressure on productivity 
enhancement remains very high. In most sectors of the economy there will be a strong 
need for skilling. At the same time there is evidence that the need for skilling may be 
compensated for by decreasing labour costs and the flexibilisation of labour. There are 
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therefore strong signs of segmentation of the workforce within companies and between 
sectors. Skilling is led strongly by the need of organisations to improve their productivity 
and competitiveness rather than needs of employees with regard to employability and 
career development. The trend of skilling labour on the workplace and the contents of 
training fitted with the needs of the company may not be the exception – like found in the 
automotive sector – but seems to have a broader resonance across the economy. 
The productivity puzzle remains intrinsically linked to the need for skilling, but a crucial 
element in the discussion here is how to measure productivity and how to link it to skill 
development and the deployment of labour in the work organisation. The link between 
the two is hardly disputed, but we did not find evidence of the two being addressed as a 
combined target of HR and strategic policies of companies. The link is as such always 
hard to disentangle because of the problems of measurement (for example difficulties 
comparing part-time and full-time labour) and the difficulty of the correlation between 
investment in training and skilling and productivity at the company level. 
Like the case of the impact of the financial crisis clearly shows, competition may be not 
be that much dependent on labour – while there may be work intensification at the same 
time – but more on external forces and the role of financial targets of companies. The 
financialisation of companies leads more the strategy rather than investment in HR and 
competition and, therefore, becomes more influential, also determining wage levels, than 
investment in HR and skilling. This is probably the main reason for the absence of 
productivity agreements as they were quite common in the 70-ies and 80-ies. The 
productivity puzzle has moved from labour to finances but did not disappear. On the 
contrary, the urgency is even higher with the coming Brexit putting its shades over the 
economy.  
 
 
3. Participation and Voice Cross Sector Analysis 
 
Participation is generally viewed as a major incentive for employees to be more satisfied 
with the work and for employees to have a long term loyalty and commitment with the 
organisation. Traditional forms of employee participation put more emphasis on voice 
trade unions for being involved decision making. Elements of participation with regard 
to voice are more rarely found in the UK. One reason for this being the slow and only 
fragmented development of the Works Council as an institution of voice in the UK. By 
effect the most common form of employee participation is with the management taking 
the lead and largely defining processes and outcomes of participation. 
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Table 4: Voice and participation trends 
 
 Manufacturing Retail Healthcare Hospitality 
Employee Participation     
Employers led ✔ ✔ ✔ Limited 
Communication ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Organisational development Essential Limited Professional 
needs 
✔ 
Decision making and voice Consensual Limited Professionally 
oriented 
_ 
Role of trade unions Strong Limited strong Limited 
Direct participation ✔ ✔ ✔ Limited 
 
There is a considerable amount of evidence of employee participation being integrated in 
shop floor management. Communication and direct participation are the dominant forms 
of participation, being more directly led by management targeting organisational goals. 
The motivation for the introduction of such schemes can be mainly found in the need for 
efficiency enhancement, communication as a part of the organisational culture and quality 
improvement across processes and the management of it. 
As also found in various research across the UK, like the WERS survey and research on 
the impact of ICE regulation at workplaces, there is very little evidence of real voice. 
Voice may be part of employment relations where either trade unions have an outspoken 
influence on working conditions within the company and the shop floor or works councils 
representing the workforce having an effective influence on decision making within the 
company. Both of these channels are under threat as the last is hardly developed, or at 
best very fragmented, across the UK. The position of trade unions is clearly dependent 
on the levels of union membership within the company and the effectiveness of their 
mobilisation of employee voice. In some cases trade unions may be effective as 
representation of employees but they may act in a more consensual way than traditionally 
used to be the case in British industrial relations. In retail, Tesco appears to be a case 
where there is both distributive and integrative bargaining. The last seems more common 
with various types of social partnership being more common. In the case of Toyota there 
is subtle interplay between the parties involved and the label of the negotiations indicates 
more a unilateral approach, more common in Japanese employment relations, than a 
pluralistic approach. Obviously, there is still more influence on various aspects of 
working conditions and pay than in sectors with low union membership, like the 
hospitality sector. 
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When considering the impact of direct participation on productivity development there is 
a clear implicit link between both. As mentioned before, quality and continuous 
improvement are the main targets with direct participation and they are most relevant for 
the improvement of productivity. But, rather than productivity as such, the main focus is 
on the competitive position of corporations in the globalised economy. As productivity 
becomes ever more dependent on financial aspects of the business the strategic focus 
moves on now to the question how to improve the financial position and more emphasis 
is put on shareholders value rather than long tern development and productivity 
enhancement. 
 
 
4. Equality Cross Sector Analysis 
 
This project examined inclusion and diversity in four sectors, retail, manufacturing, 
healthcare and hospitality. A cross sector analysis of the findings demonstrate several 
commonalities between the sectors; continuation of historical occupational segregation, 
a focus on gender and ethnicity, little evidence of mainstreaming of equality issues and 
small gains in equality bargaining. Several points of divergence also exist; the role of the 
trade union in securing equality outcomes, the type of equality strands mentioned and the 
role of the business case for diversity. Each of these themes, demonstrated in the table 
below, will now be explored in more detail. 
 
Table 5: Inclusion and diversity trends 
 
Sector Manufacturing Retail Healthcare Hospitality 
Reported historical occupational 
segregation? 
✔  ✔ ✔ 
Gender ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Race ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Disability  ✔   
LGBT(I) ✔ ✔   
Is Equality bargaining present?   ✔  
Reported significant gains the 
equality arena? 
  ✔  
Equality was reported to be reactive 
or proactively pursued? 
Proactive (for 
gender) 
Reactive Proactive Reactive 
Business Case rationale reported? ✔    
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Role of the trade union in respect of 
equality? 
Marginal Marginal Strong None 
 
Firstly, in three of the four sectors, manufacturing, healthcare and hospitality, the social 
partners noted historical occupational segregation. This historical segregation has 
continued to the present day with hospitality and healthcare dominated by female workers 
and manufacturing by a male workforce. This occupational segregation was reported to 
have impact on equality outcomes. While gender segregation is not a new phenomenon 
(Campos-Soria et al. 2011; Jarman et al. 2012) scholars disagree about the impact of 
segregation on equality outcomes. Jarman et al. (2012) report that women fare better 
when they are in more segregated organisations, where the smaller the pay advantage 
received by men, the greater the female advantage on stratification. In contrast, Stier and 
Yaish (2014) report that women fall behind men in most dimensions of job quality in 
segregated occupations. What this research shows is that when occupational segregation 
exists there are still issues of gender equality that need addressing. The dominance of 
women in the hospitality and healthcare sectors has not reduced the amount of gender 
inequality faced by female workers.  
The second key trend is the dominance of gender issues on the equality agenda. When 
interviewed the social partners in each sector referred to initiatives to improve gender 
equality. For example, in healthcare job evaluations were initiated to address gender 
inequality, in the manufacturing case study trade union and management were 
implementing initiatives to address the glass ceiling and challenge the notion of 
manufacturing being ‘men’s work’, retail was exploring women’s health and hospitality 
focused on the uniforms that were unsuitable for the female body shape and the safety of 
female domestic staff.  
Thirdly, only one of the four sectors reported equality bargaining in its true form where 
issues of gender equality are addressed in collective bargaining negotiations. Healthcare 
reported that gender issues are present in its integrative and distributive bargaining. 
Hospitality alluded to gender dimensions to its collective bargaining but due to a lack of 
recognition bargaining does not take place. What this trend hints at is a marginalisation 
of equality issues to a more case by case, firefighting agenda. Indeed, all sectors reported 
ongoing battles with management around equality issues without these issues being 
addressed at collective bargaining level. 
Penultimate, the analysis of the four sectors showed very little gains in the equality arena. 
Those gains that were secured, such as the women’s health initiative in retail or 
promotions training in manufacturing were limited to marginal areas and not core to the 
business. This trend is suggestive of marginalisation of equality issues where equality 
issues take second place to organisational agendas (Colling, Dickens 1998). 
In general, equality issues that were tackled were reactively addressed as opposed to 
proactively pursued. In healthcare, for example, equality initiatives that came from 
management were usually in response to changes in legislation.  
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While the above trends suggest commonalities among the sectors, there were also 
important points of divergence. Firstly, the role and influence of the trade union was 
different in each sector. In healthcare the trade union had a more powerful role in equality 
which was attributed to the more European structure of collective bargaining that occurs 
in the NHS. In retail and manufacturing there was a more marginal scope for trade union 
involvement in equality and in hospitality there was no room for equality bargaining due 
to the lack of recognition in the sector. These findings support earlier work that 
centralized bargaining systems and high bargaining coverage, as found in the NHS are 
likely to support equality outcomes (Briskin 2014). 
A second divergence among the sectors is the strands of equality mentioned by the social 
partners. Only retail mentioned disability in passing while all the other sectors did not 
highlight disability in their equality agenda. LGBT issues received a mention by social 
partners in manufacturing and retail but not healthcare or hospitality. Ethnicity was 
referred to by healthcare, manufacturing, retail and hospitality, although it received less 
attention than gender.  
Finally, the business case rationale for promoting equality was only mentioned by social 
partners in manufacturing. While this omission by other sectors does not mean that the 
business case does not drive equality agendas, it hints at a place for a more social justice 
rationale for inclusion in the other sectors. The lack of discussion around the business 
case is surprising given that equality action is usually taken in response to the idea that 
equality will serve organisational interests, rather than just address social fairness or 
comply with the law (Colling, Dickens 1998).  
The patterns in these findings suggest that unions attempt to address equality issues but 
their success has been uneven and patchy, as reported in earlier work by Bacon and Hoque 
(2012) and Milner (2017). The TUC (2016b) reported that economic concerns preside 
over equality bargaining agenda, which is also found in this study (see also Briskin 2014). 
Overall, equality agendas in trade unions have a large scope for action despite recent wins 
by some trade unions. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The report indicates that productivity does not play a large role in the UK. A decentralised 
collective bargaining structure has led to workplaces with weak unions and a management 
preoccupation with lowering unit labour costs. Healthcare stands apart with its multi-
union, national terms and conditions. Yet despite this more European model of collective 
bargaining, the sector still experiences lack of investment in skills, preoccupation with 
unit cost and little attention to inclusion and diversity. This does, however, not imply that 
the main trend is low costs/ low skills economy with no investment in labour. The 
automotive sector may be looked upon as a sector leading the way for others in several 
ways: high investment in skills for core jobs, but the type of skills mainly focused on 
processes and quality enhancement.  
Overall, across the sectors the lack of productivity growth is not reflected in collective 
bargaining. A major difference with the 1970s, when productivity agreements were 
widespread, is the level of wage moderation and the levels of consumer spending. 
Recently there is a slowing down of wage increases to below the level of inflation, which 
means a real wage decrease for many jobs. Data from XpertHR indicate that 30% of pay 
settlements clustered on 2% (XpertHR, 2017). For the public sector there is a wage cap 
of 1%, which is now being disputed with some within the Government arguing for an end 
to this cap in recognition of public backlash to pay restraint. This situation is 
fundamentally different from the period before when, during the ‘trente glorieuses’, the 
economy was expanding, growth figures were high and, at the same time, in the UK lower 
than in other European countries. While we may find in the current study the impact of a 
lack of coordination on productivity – as there are no trade-offs between management 
and labour above the company-level –, productivity agreements were used in the 1970s 
as a catalyst to decentralise collective bargaining. This paradox, where productivity leads 
to less coordination, which now seems to hamper productivity, would be hard to remedy 
although such attempts are found for example in the proposal from Labour during the last 
elections campaign to re-introduce sectoral bargaining as a mechanism to enhance 
solidarity within sectors. 
The current lack of efforts to address productivity within sectors and across the economy 
is also reflected in the fact we did not find any productivity agreements, while 
productivity growth is more implicitly targeted with collective bargaining. In some 
sectors participation of employees appears to be targeted on both quality enhancement 
(automotive) and achieving high professional quality standards (health). Such policies are 
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directly linked to improvement of work processes and, therefore, productivity 
enhancement.  
There is one more aspect of the economy which affects the levels of spending and wages, 
which is wage distribution. The level of wage inequality has risen year by year since 1979 
(Dorling 2015). The pressure on wages at the low end implies that spending occurs on 
the basis of debts rather than prosperity, which will unavoidably impact the sluggish 
growth of GDP and productivity per hour. This trend is not unique for the UK, but appears 
to be more widely accepted here when compared with other EU member states. As 
mentioned before in this chapter of the report the role of trade unions and the loss of their 
bargaining power has a clear impact on wage development. When wage moderation may 
be driven in other economies by the coordination of labour market policies and the trade-
off between objectives, like with regard to flexibility and security of jobs, the role of trade 
unions in the UK is markedly different in the sense that the system of industrial relations 
has been decentralised and fragmented – cynically enough on the back of productivity 
agreements in the 1970s and 1980s. The effects of the lack of coordination of labour 
markets can most noticeably be found in the hospitality sector, where cost control and 
flexibilisation became most dominant in the strategy of employers. 
What the conclusions, therefore, point to is the need for a coordinated industrial policy, 
supported by legislation, in order to move the UK to an economy where meaningful 
collective bargaining can thrive and outstrip the financialisation agenda. Productivity 
growth should, in such a model, be led by industrial relations on the basis of social 
dialogue and long-term development. 
The future of productivity is hard to predict under the increased levels of uncertainty in 
the economy. Brexit sheds its shades on the whole economy with inflation going up with 
the low Pound Sterling and, therefore, the need to adjust pay levels accordingly. Even 
with the high public debt there are signs that there is willingness within the Government 
to leave strict wage increases within the 1% boundary and public sector unions announced 
the target of a wage increase of 4-5% for the coming negotiations in the Autumn. 
This is only before the actual start of Brexit where there is not any clarity about the type 
of relationships between the UK economy and the EU Single Market and the type of trade 
deal targeted. The prospects of a hard Brexit would, however, severely impact the 
economy implying a return to a type of economy without any coordination and 
deregulated labour markets, where productivity will be most of all achieved by pushing 
the limits of working hours, unlimited intensification of work and unrestricted 
competition at the costs of the majority of the working people. The social economy went 
earlier on through a transition from a more regulated to a fragmented one – the next 
transition could however be an even further step back into history. 
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